Skepticism: The Experience of Freedom, Self-Deception

Skepticism

Introduction

Self-consciousness has the capacity to learn from its experience in the living objective world of appearances. Over time, it gets better at expressing its inner activity, its thoughts, attitudes, desires, through speech and deed. It can convey its own inner activity, the activity of the objective external reality, the relation between the two, with a higher degree of nuance and precision. This ability is not bestowed upon it by some higher power in accordance to a mechanistic and lawful principle, reality is not a welfare state. This ability is earned through its own persistent efforts.

It has been months since the last update for this blog. In that timespan I have lost 30 pounds of fat and gained the same amount in muscle, I have improved my ability to grasp Newtonian mechanics and calculus, have learned statistics and probability theory, have improved my relationships, most importantly with my family members, all in accordance to a single unified principle, which we will uncover in the following set of posts. A week remains before another semester begins; I shall attempt to update this blog as much as I can until then, perhaps and hopefully reaching the end of observing Reason. If we are able to reach that goal, we shall for the first time be able to provide the beginnings of a truly objective and rational account of the major political developments as of this writing, including the migration crisis in Europe and North America, the ascent of Donald Trump, and the student protests in North American universities. These are all related.

That being said, I must admit that I do not recall the details of what I have written in the past regarding the journey of self-consciousness towards Absolute Knowing; most of what I have said has sunk into my unconscious mind, solidifying and crystalizating into conceptual girders that compose my immediate experience of the Here and Now. This is a basic consequence of living in time for self-consciousness; the content of its conscious awareness is limited and has boundaries. It cannot sense nor perceive the infinitude of universal substance. It can only make contact with the universal substance with its intellect; the ability to have this kind of intellection is developed as a kind of mind product through the refinement of its thoughts.

The stoic self-consciousness engages in this kind of activity of thought refinement. Its thoughts are stable and inert lawlike generalizations of the recurring patterns that it is able to apprehend from the universal fluctuations of the world of appearances. The stable and inert character of the stoics thoughts animate the stable and inert character of the stoic. He is calm and tranquil, he restrains the external expression of his emotions and animal, he apprehends objective reality with an inquisitive and systematic demeaner. He is, in principle, free. His freedom is a conceptual and hypothetical kind of freedom, which appears alongside a hard determinism that contradicts this conceptual freedom.

In principle, the stoic is free, but also determined. The stoic lives in accordance with two thought products, free will and hard determinism, that are mutually exclusive. They cannot be true at the same time for self-consciousness as it has developed thus far. This results in a division, a splitting up, of a single self-consciousness into two distinct self-consciousnesses residing in the same living body. This bifurication of self-consciousness serves as the basis for a new shape of self-consciousness, the skeptic.

The Skeptical Attitude

The stoic self-consciousness was like a stable, inert, law onto itself. Self-consciousness is the unity that has the capacity to differentiate itself from itself while remaining itself. In the very act of self-awareness, it makes itself into an object for itself, assigning for itself the role of knower and known simultaneously. As knower, the stoic is the legislator of laws for itself, it is commander. As known, the stoic obeys those self-imposed laws, it is commanded. As such, the stoic cannot help but express the law of inversion - like becomes unlike, commander becomes commanded, freedom becomes determinism, self unity becomes self division.

The stoic attitude, in being lawlike, stable and inert, that is, theoretical, exists in opposition to the objective world of appearances. The world is unstable, alternating, in flux; the stoic cannot account for this flux qua flux with its stable and inert lawlike generalizations. As we saw in the understanding, the flux of appearances lies outside the scope of the inert stability of the stoic's lawlike generalizations. The stoic discounts the flux of appearances by calling it unreasonable, and rigidly endures the flux by means of a rigid personality that endures.

This rigid endurance constitutes the nature of the first half of the divided self of the skeptic, and is epitomized by Seneca the Younger. It is cut off from the multiplicity of the living world of appearances, and is indifferent to natural existence. This first half is above and beyond the flux of appearances; while it is immersed in external reality, it is not subject to it. This self-consciousness is only subject to itself. It legislates and casts judgment upon itself. In producing thought products in accordance to the principles of logic, it determines what is and what is not reasonable and good, thus it legislates and casts judgment upon the external world of appearances.

The skeptic inherits the stoic attitude as its transcendent self. Self-consciousness has internalized the role the lord that commands, legislates, and casts judgment. The lord enjoys the satisfaction of his desire through the labor of the bondsman. The transcendent self has a transcendent desire that it wishes to satisfy - freedom. The labor of the other pole of the skeptic, the contingent self, transforms the conceptual freedom of the stoic into an actuality.

Skepticism is the living experience of free thinking. Rather than being theoretical freedom, it is actual freedom. The contingent self is in a continuous state of inward rebellion. When it comes to legislating and casting judgment upon itself, rather than obey itself, it disobeys. The restraint of emotion and the rigid personality of the stoic gives way to the free expression of emotion and the slack personality of the skeptic. In legislating and casting judgment upon the external world of appearances, the skeptic doubts its own legislation and suspends its own judgment.

If the stoic self-consciousness is prevalent during the height of the Roman Empire, one that commands and obeys, then the skeptical self-consciousness is prevalent during the period in Roman history that has come to be called the Crisis of the Third Century. The skeptical self-consciousness commands yet fails to obey, obeys yet fails to command, or worst of all, fails to both command and obey; its slackness leads to self-bewildering self-contradiction. The skeptic attains the independence that was sought after by the stoic. Certain that it cannot attain the certainty of absolute knowledge and itself, the skeptic self-consciousness is certain of its having absolved itself of every kind of self-contradiction and the tension that goes along with it. Through uncertainty it is certain that it has achieved the transcendent tranquility of ataraxia.

Pyrrhonic Skepticism

The skeptical self-consciousness escapes from the grasp of universality and runs into the arms of contingency. Its concern is not to attain the stable, self-same, lawlike, and universal character of thought, but to immerse itself in the fluctuating, self-differentiating, lawless, and particular world of appearances. Its concern is the short-term, decadent, satisfaction of its desires as they arise, whatever they may. The flux of appearances is unstable, nothing stable can be derived from it, for no reasonable premises, due to the following reasonable premises:

(1) the composition of material objects never remain the same, but are subject to change; water becomes ice, or it may become vapor, we cannot be certain which. Since the parts of the objective world are subject to random, unpredictable change, so too is the whole of the objective world.

(2) objective thoughts, in the form of lawlike commands, or stable inferences about experience derived by means of induction never remain the same, stable, and inert; they are subject to change; the fluidity of thought cancels its validity.

These stable and inert lawlike generalizations about the impossibility and invalidity of stable and inert lawlike generalizations regarding the objective world of appearances  lead to the following impossible, invalid, stable, yet unstable generalizations about the instability of subjective experience, i.e. the skeptical self-consciousness' sensory and perceptual experience of the objective world:

(3) "The same impressions are not produced by the same objects owing to the differences in animals." Every species of animals has its own unique mode in which they subjectively experience the objective world.

(4) The same impressions are not produced by the same objects owing to the differences among human beings. Every human being, which is a kind of animal, has his own unique mode in which he experiences the objective world of appearances. Substances, their qualities, quantity, relations, etc., present themselves in as many diverse modes as there are human self-consciousnesses.

The skeptical self-consciousness is a moral relativist.

Moral relativism is a natural consequence of the mixture of a multitude of self-consciousnesses with a multitude of histories.

(5) The same impressions are not produced by the same objects owing to the differences among the senses.

Since there is no stability in the objective world of appearances or in the activity of knowing , there is no stability in one when it relates to the other.

(6) "Based on positions, distances, and locations; for owing to each of these the same objects appear different." The same tower appears rectangular at close distance and round from far away. The moon looks like a perfect sphere to the human eye, yet cratered from the view of a telescope. Motion is relative, nothing is in absolute rest.

(7) "Since all things appear relative, we will suspend judgement about what things exist absolutely and really existent. Do things which exist "differentially" as opposed to those things that have a distinct existence of their own, differ from relative things or not? If they do not differ, then they too are relative; but if they differ, then, since everything which differs is relative to something..., things which exist absolutely are relative."

Even those objects that appear to self-consciousness to be at rest have no stability:

(8) "Based, as we said, on the quantity and constitution of the underlying objects, meaning generally by 'constitution' the manner of composition." So, for example, goat horn appears black when intact and appears white when ground up. Snow appears white when frozen and translucent as a liquid.

(9) “We deduce that since no object strikes us entirely by itself, but along with something else, it may perhaps be possible to say what the mixture compounded out of the external object and the thing perceived with it is like, but we would not be able to say what the external object is like by itself."

(10) We can never know what an object is like independently of its being known. Nothing stable can be derived from the unstable world of appearances, or the unstable activity of knowing. If self-consciousness cannot derive in truth the stable thought products it claims to produce in accordance to the so-called stable rules of logical, which includes the conditional statements with conjunctive antecedents, then self-consciousness cannot judge itself or other self-consciousnesses, or the objective world. Further, no self-consciousness has the authority to command itself or others, nor does any self-consciousness have the responsibility to obey either itself or other self-consciousnesses.

For the skeptical self-consciousness, no thought product has the status of being reasonable or justifiable, and a fortiori, no thought product has the unique status being Absolutely True, including, and except for those of the kind listed above. Indeed, the entire logical edifice constructed by the stoics, where premises support conclusions validly in accordance to syllogistic and propositional logic, must be deconstructed by the problem of infinite regress:

"Those who claim for themselves to judge the truth are bound to possess a criterion of truth. This criterion, then, either is without a judge's approval or has been approved. But if it is without approval, whence comes it that it is truthworthy? For no matter of dispute is to be trusted without judging. And, if it has been approved, that which approves it, in turn, either has been approved or has not been approved, and so on ad infinitum." - Sextus Empiricus

Every premise must be justified by another justified premise. Yet no premise is self-evidently justified, so no premise, and hence, no conclusion, is justifiable, reasonable, or good. This applies, ultimately, to the self that makes that claim, since it is the self that is the source of lawlike judgments, legislations, and generalization. The archetype of a self-consciousness that makes the declaration: "All I know is that I know nothing", while claiming to be free of the entanglements of self-contradiction, is indeed immersed in it to such a degree that its self-contradiction escapes its self-conscious awareness. The irony.

Academic Skepticism

The skeptical self-consciousness makes proclamations declaring the Absolute prevalence of flux in the objective world of appearances, in the subjective activity of self-consciousness, and in the relation between the two. Nothing stable, including the very proclamation just mentioned, can be derived from the objective fluctuating world of appearances. That the skeptical self-consciousness makes such a proclamation at all is eo ipso a rebuttal of that very same proclamation, for the proclamation of the prevalence and Absoluteness of flux is a stable and inert legislative act that skeptical self-consciousness steadfastly and dogmatically clings to.

Also known as the Socratic Method

In asserting the contingency and particularity of both itself and its relation to the world of appearances via its thoughts, it only establishes the truth of the necessity and universality of thought. Through perplexing itself and others, certian of the untruth of knowledge, it arrives at the certainty of knowledge. To see this via negativa towards knowing in action one need only read the Platonic dialogues.

Skeptical self-consciousness becomes aware of the self-contradiction it was certain of having freed itself from, and revises its attempt to know through ignorance. Self-consciousness now declares: "This alone I know, that I know nothing; I cannot know even whether I know or not." The suspension of knowledge is absolute. Knowledge, whether of self or objectivity, is impossible, except for the knowledge that knowledge is impossible. The students of Plato are able to express successfully what Socrates meant to express. 

Conclusion

Yet the successful expression of Socratic doubt is the successful revelation of its ridiculous and wretched self-ignorance. In creating the facade and illusory appearance of virtue and knowledge, all the while condemning the sophistry of facades and illusory appearances of virtue and knowledge, Socrates engages in the same facade and illusory appearance of virtue and knowledge he condemns. Let us not, however, be angry with Socrates and demand his execution, for he knew not what what he was doing.

Skeptical self-consciousness is divided within itself to such a degree that it is not aware of its own self division, but rather fancies itself to be whole and complete. Its suspension of judgment is its affirmation. Attempting to escape the rigidity of the stoic self-consciousness, it falls into the bottomless pit of infinite regress. Self-consciousness cannot help but grasp onto the same rigid structure of logic, the same tranquil and self-same transcendent self-communion of universal thought which it sought to escape. It uses the same reasons to which it denies metaphysical necessity to support its own position. Just as the bondsman was wretched in the eyes of the lord, so too is the contingent half of the skeptical self-consciousness wretched in the eyes of the transcendent half of the skeptical self-consciousness, itself. The skeptic feels shame, and does not know the fount whence that shame gushes forth.

Having corrected itself, that knowlegde is impossible, except the knowledge that knowledge is impossible, self-consciousness shows itself to be aware of its inner division. This self-consciousness, aware of itself as a contingent, particular, and profane animal life, estranged and fallen from the gr6ace of its other half as a necessary, universal, and sacred godlike tranquility, is a new shape of self-consciousness. The skeptical self-consciousness has become the unhappy consciousness.

Stoicism: On the Nature of Thinking, On the Origins and Nature of Free Will and Determinism, and On Manly Restraint

Stoicism

Epictetus, a stoic slave.

Introduction

Self-consciousness is still on its journey towards absolute knowing. We have traced out its movement from the very beginning, restraining ourselves in the kinds of inferences we can make regarding the nature of consciousness, as well as its abilities, as far as we are able. The journey of consciousness has been marked by a strict adherence to a single, axiomatic, assumption. It has been guided by a single principle. We have taken care to restrict ourselves from the urge to introduce extraneous elements to the journey of consciousness to absolute knowing which are not allowable by the first assumption, or any other inference that is allowed by that first and most fundamental principle: knowing is distinct from the the object of knowledge. Certain words are introduced only because those words are commonly used by German and English speakers to refer to such phenomena, as they have arisen, from the journey of consciousness. 

If our statements are not a direct consequence of the first principle, and the development of that first principle, then it is because it is from the undeniable nature of reality. We began with only three such statements: (i) reality is real, (ii) reality is spatial, and space is an extended expanse, two-dimensional and three-dimensional, composed of unique points, (iii) reality is temporal, and time is an extended expanse, one-dimensional, composed of unique points. Finally, we assume that true knowledge begins with the senses. Only by sensing the real world, and itself, does consciousness come to know the world and itself. In addition to these three assumptions, along with the first axiom, we have in total five axioms. Thus, any other point that has been mentioned in all these articles are justifiable by the development which result from a kind of development unfolding from the interaction of the five principle, and fundamental, axioms. We have come across points that are considered to be factual judgments, as well as points that are considered to be value judgments, i.e. moral lessons.

Some of these factual claims are scientific in nature, and refer to the condition of objects and living things. Other factual claims are historical in nature, and are connected to the human condition as it really has been experienced, and documented, in our history. The retort that history is written by the winners is irrelevant. Even our genetic code is written by winners. Winners have the right to creating our reality, physical and mental. It just so happens that the factual claims made in these articles are supported by scientific research and confirmed by the writings of historians. Since we cannot provide a rational account for that connection between what has been written here, and real world history, from our axioms or what has been developed thencefrom, we shall consider such associations to be merely a fortunate coincidence. 

In regards to value judgements, as well as the discussion of the appearance of virtue and vice in history, these are strictly extracted from the development of the five axioms. The English words we use to summarize them are again from necessity. These words are what people commonly use to refer to such traits of character, at least historically, and thus we must use them as well. There is no other way for us to express these ideas in the English language, in a written manner, preserving them from the decay of time, on a blog of all places. Words that are not written are merely memories, and like all memories are washed away by the stream of consciousness, and the flow of time.

Now, the value judgments are also a necessary consequence of the development of consciousness and self-consciousness at this point in the development. It just so happens that these judgments have been espoused and confirmed in one way or another by all lawmakers that have ever appeared in our global history as a species by the greatest philosophers and holy men, such as Mohammed, Moses, Jesus, Socrates, Confucius, the Buddha, Lao-Tzu, etc. This is, since we cannot provide still a rational account for that connection between what has been written here, and the real words attributed to those sages from our axioms or what has been developed thencefrom, it is again a coincidence. Even though we are excited about such a coincidence, we still exercise strict self-restraint, and follow the development as it unfolds only in its own terms.

Self-restraint is the animating principle of the Stoic. Stoicism is the focus of this article. While Hegel only commits five paragraphs to the discussion of the Stoic, we will commit more. Our own tracing of the development of consciousness and self-consciousness has yielded more fruit than Hegel's exposition, we say things that Hegel did not say, yet could have said. If Hegel were alive today, he would be in total agreement with our extra content, since it is in strict accordance to the guiding principle that allowed him to write the entirety of the phenomenology as he did. We were only able to add more content due to our living in a time further along the historical development of self-consciousness, on its way to absolute knowing, than Hegel. Thus, while this may be a blog that is dedicated only to the interpretation of Hegel's phenomenology, it also is independent of Hegel. We, as readers, along with the bondsman, have developed a mind of our own. In future articles, when it is appropriate, we shall begin an exhaustive analysis on the most recent events in human history, and we shall uncover the truth of the human condition in the 21st century. Indeed, we shall uncover the truth of the human condition as it is on the day that the article is actually written, up to and including why this blog was written now, by me. Yet, for now, we trace the path of self-consciousness, now taking the shape of the Stoic, and refer to Hegel's account of the Stoic as a guidestone to our own account.

You are witnessing, therefore, the development of a new systematic philosophy for the 21st century. I shall not, however, attach a name to it. This is not Riveran philosophy, since my name is Carlos Rivera; nor is it Leonean philosophy, since my name was supposed to be Carlos de Leon, in honor of my father's line, whose ancestors originated from Leon, Spain. The writer of this is hispanic, with a lineage that goes back to the Central America, extends to Spain, which was occupied by the Visigothic Spaniards and the Arab Moors, as well as Africans. The Visigothic Spaniards settled there just before the fall of the Western Roman Empire in 476 A.D. The Visigoths were themselves the first set of Goths that crossed the Danube river in Eastern Europe, and settled on Roman territory. The Visigoths, followed by the Ostrogoths, the latter of whom ended up settling in Italy, were a part of the Gothic tribe, who themselves were migrants from Scandinavia. In the course of their centuries-long journey from Scandinavia to Spain, the Goths interacted with, and bred, with the Huns, who are of Asian descent.

Thus, the genetic line of the Hispanics extends from all the races of the Earth. It is a universal lineage to which I belong, from which I spring. Therefore, I cannot taint this philosophy with my particularity, and this is the only section where I shall allow that stain to surface. I am not the author of this philosophy. It was bound to be espoused. A man named Carlos Rivera de Leon just so happened make a blog and write it. Hegel and I follow the same guiding principle, logic, or better yet, the divine logos. I use the word logos, instead of "logic", because I wish to distance myself from what modern day academics have reduced that term to; further I wish to distance myself from the secularization that term, logic, has endured at the hands of those kinds of  individuals who unthinkingly attach themselves to the cult of scientism, and their followers, who brazenly lie to themselves and to each other's faces about their being paragons of independence. Followers are submissive to their leaders; they are not independent, as we have seen with the bondsman. Personally, I am not attached to Hegel because of any dogmatic devotion or obsession, but because my attachment to Hegel is necessitated by the activity of logos. My only wish is for my reader to be an independent individual who can think for himself. 

That being said, we shall exercise self-restraint, and concern ourselves only with the development of the Stoic as it has appeared before us. Before we go on in discussing the development proper, and comparing the mental and social condition of the Stoic to his innate standard of success and the point towards which he is moving, Spirit, let us examine the behaviour of the perennial Stoic, Epictetus. His picture is at the top of this article, and you can see from the picture that he has a at his side a crutch. He needed that crutch because he was a cripple. The manner in which he became a cripple is a perfect expression of what Stoicism represents.

Epictetus was a bondsman, more specifically, a slave. His lord treated him cruelly. There was an occasion in which the lord was holding Epictetus' leg in an awkward position, with Epictetus being pinned to the ground. With characteristic Stoic indifference, Epictetus spoke to his lord with a calm, tranquil, and indifferent tone, "If you continue to hold my leg in such a manner, you will break it." The lord continued to hold his leg in such a manner, and indeed, he broke it. Without flinching, without expressing any pain, his relationship with himself remaining undisturbed, Epictetus remarked with that same calm and indifferent tone, "I told you so." Such is the extent to which the Stoic restrained himself and his desires, as well as his urge to express his emotions. 

In addition to this, Epictetus was a well known lecturer. He lived his life as a thinker. Epictetus had very good relations with the Emperor Hadrian, the third of the Five Good Emperors. It is said that the Emperor was friendly with Epictetus, and it is also said that the Emperor attended his lectures. Hadrian himself went on to adopt Antoninus Pius as his heir. He made a good choice. Edward Gibbon, the pre-eminent Roman historian and author of the iconic book: The History of The Rise and Fall of the Roman Empire, made the remark that Antoninus Pius was such a good emperor (lord of lords) that representatives from surrounding kingdoms begged him to rule them and the kingdoms they represented. Those representatives, who were bondsmen, faithfully expressed the will of their lords. 

In his turn, when he ascended to the throne, on the recommendation of Hadrian, Antoninus Pius went on to adopt the "other" famous Stoic, Marcus Aurelius, as heir to the throne of the Roman Empire. Marcus Aurelius, during the course of his world went on to complete a composition a series of letters to himself, since the day of his coronation, which were published posthumously after his death. These letters comprised a work known as the Meditations. He wrote these letters for himself in private - nobody knew of their existence. As we have shown, there is a direct historical link between Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. The content of the Meditations gives us access into the private activities of the mind of the Stoic Emperor, Marcus Aurelius. The Meditations are considered to be a perennial work on Stoic philosophy. Marcus Aurelius was just as much a philosopher as he was the most powerful man in the Roman Empire. 

If you care to notice the content of the picture directly above this statement, you will notice that Marcus Aurelius writes to himself as if he has learned from the experience of the bondsman, which we discussed in detail in the previous article. He talks about surrender, strength, discontent i.e. dissatisfaction, and weakness. These are all the traits of a bondsman who surrenders in the battle for life and death. While we did admit that the lord developed a sense of practical reason, phronesis, in response to the stubbornness of a bondsman who has developed a mind of his own, one gets the sense that the Emperor not only developed a sense of phronesis, but also of pure wisdom, sophia. One can only possess pure wisdom, as we have already mentioned, by the bondsman. His entire being quakes and trembles in fear of violent death, nothing at all within him remains stable and fixed amidst that trembling. A typical lord, while he does engage in continuous warfare, cannot allow his fear to overcome him and engulf his entire being. If he were to do so, he would have to surrender in the struggle for life and death. 

Marcus Aurelius is an emperor, a lord of lords. He, in his lifetime, could never have allowed himself to be engulfed by the fear of violent death. Moreover, he's a stoic. He does not express his emotions, including fear. A lord of lords could have never surrendered in the struggle for life and death, otherwise he wouldn't be a lord of lords. He would have been a bondsman. Yet he writes to himself in private, where nobody can see him; writing as if he at one point in his development really did experience that absolute fear of violent death, and really did surrender the struggle for life and death. In his lifetime, furthermore, Marcus Aurelius never experienced bondage as a living reality for himself and others. He was never a slave, unless every Roman historian at the time was censored by the Roman state, and by the penalty of death did not dare make a record of the lost period of time in the life of Marcus Aurelius where he experienced bondage, and sullied his hands by work and labor, it follows that this paradox can only be resolved if we state that the self-consciousness that was Marcus Aurelius experienced the fear of violent death, and surrendered in a struggle for life and death, and went on to experience bondage, in another existence, i.e. in another lifetime. We will make a hypothesis, one which may or may not be demonstrable, by claiming that the link between Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius went beyond being merely a historical link. 

Conflation is a kind of error that the mind is prone to fall into.

With such a consideration aside, let us now continue on with the journey of consciousness on its path towards absolute knowing, this time taking the shape of the Stoic.

The Pure Thought of the Stoic; His Free Will

The bondsman has developed a mind of his own through his work and labor. He has learned that the product he fashions through his work and labor is an actual living objective existence. The finished product is independent and self-subsisting - a vanishing that nevertheless remains. Yet, this independent product is dependent on the independence of the bondsman for its own independence. The bondsman's independence stems from his capacity to restrain and check his desire to consume the object. The bondsman's capacity to restrain and check himself is an expression of the bondsman's independence of his desire, and therefore, of the living objective world of appearances. In having come upon this realization, and further realizing that the object does not punish him for making this realization, the bondsman re-gains an arousing suspicion of his self-subsistent independence, his being-for-self, his relating of self to self in tranquil equilibrium. Indeed, this suspicion is a confirmed fact. The bondsman is independent through his self-restraint. The finished product, which exists in the living objective world of appearance, is dependent on the bondsman's independence for its own independence. Reciprocally, the bondsman is dependent on the object for his own independence. In relating to the object, the bondsman is being-for-self and being-for-another. He is truly independent only through the finished product. The self-consciousness of the bondsman, in making himself an object for himself while remaining subject, is the Absolute standard of truth for himself.

At the same time, the lord still holds the power of life and death over the bondsman. Having learned from the experience of revolt, either through quashing an unsuccessful revolt or becoming lord through a successful revolt, the lord punishes, and possibly kills, the bondsman for showing signs of independence. This has three consequences for the bondsman. First, he does not engage in acts, or exhibits behaviour that would indicate to the lord that the bondsman has a mind of his own. Second, the bondsman does not react to his feelings; he does not exhibit emotion. If he exhibits to the lord the type of emotion that indicates that he has a mind of his own, he again will be punished. Since he cannot stop the activity of sensing by absolutely numbing himself, nor can he stop the activity of his self-consciousness and the process of feeling and continue to live in a living body, as discussed in a previous article, his only recourse is to restrain his emotions. Finally, he engages in thought, the only refuge where he can relate himself to himself in tranquil equilibrium, and therefore relieve the pain of being in bondage. The pain originates from a tension his self-consciousness is all too aware of: the bondsman is both dependent, and independent; yet, the independence of the bondsman is not only an an arousing suspicion, but a confirmed fact. It is not, however, a living reality. The lord does not recognize the independence of the bondsman through his finished product. Indeed, the lord consumes the finished product, and by extension the bondsman's independence. The lord has the power of life and death over the bondsman. The bondsman cannot express his independence in the real objective world of experiences for fear of violent death; and he is not in state of independence, as he thinks himself to be. He is still in bondage. This kind of contradiction causes tension for the self-consciousness of the bondsman, which he feels as pain. Such is the nature of the pain of the bondsman. All self-consciousnesses are naturally inclined to seek relief from pain. Thus, the bondsman seeks refuge, and relief, in his own thoughts. The bondsman becomes committed to the activity of thought.

The social circumstances of the bondsman gives him incentive to assume the shape of a stoic self-consciousness. The stoic self-conscious is defined precisely by the three consequences discussed in the paragraph above. He is a repressed, subordinate kind of self-consciousness who is independent only in secret, where no one in the objective living world of appearances can see his independence. He still works and labors on his product, but the product ends up being consumed by the lord, or damaged by the activity of the lord, or simply vanishes from normal wear, tear, and disrepair. The lord, in satisfying his desire, or the objective living world of appearances itself, cancels the objective living reality of the finished product - the only objective living demonstration of the bondsman's independence.

Wise words from a stoic. No one, but I, can answer my prayer for strength.

In addition to labouring and working on physical matter so as to ensure the satisfaction of the desires of the lord, as well as ensuring to the administration of his own basic desires, the stoic labours and works on his thoughts. The stoic is a thinking self-consciousness. The material which the stoic works and labors on is thought, and the finished product of his labor is thought. Instead of physical tools, he uses thought to convert thought into thought. This new thought, as a finished product, is more refined than the component thoughts that it is composed of. We see the nature of this kind of refinement. When he uses thought, he uses thought as a tool; this kind of thought is a relation. There are physical tools, which the stoic uses to work and labor on physical material, that allows him to combine physical components of a physical product, as well as to separate those components. Examples of each, respectively, are the hammer and sickle (heh). Thus, there are relations that correspond to the hammer and sickle. The relation that corresponds to the hammer, and combines thoughts, is the conjunction. The relation that corresponds to the sickle, and divides thoughts, is the disjunction. The stoic also makes use of negation as a thought tool. The stoic also uses thought as he does the material for building the objective product, i.e. as a stable, inert essence that refers and is supposed to correspond to aspects of the objective living world; this kind of thought can be called essential, since it is an essential moment for self-consciousness at the moment it makes itself aware of it as object. Self-consciousness stands opposed to and independent from the thought it confronts.

The stoic, therefore, combines, divides, negates, or makes use of any combination of these on, essential thoughts to produce a finished product, another essential thought as a finished product. Like the independent product, thought too is independent from the stoic that creates it. The finished product is more refined than its material. Further, the refined thought is dependent on its independence on the independence of the stoic. The stoic must, like the bondsman, check and restrain his desire if he is to produce a truly refined thought. If he fails to do this, the product is faulty. Refined thoughts can, in their turn, be used as material to produce yet more refined thoughts. This process can continue ad infinitum. Thus, the activity of thought, so long as it remains thought, is an unimpeded movement of consciousness. In being dependent on the independence of the stoic, the refined thought is evidence that the stoic provides for himself of his own independence. It does not decay, so long as he teaches others these thoughts, and it cannot be taken away from him by the lord.

The thought is both a relation and an essence. In mathematical terms, a thought is both a relation and a set (a collection of objects). It can be proven that thoughts are not only simple conjunctions, disjunctions, and negations, but also that thoughts are equivalence relations. Two thoughts, therefore, are not only two sets, and not only are they two relations, but also a setoid. For mathematicians, it can be proved by reductio ad absurdum that there exists no function that maps a setoid onto a two-dimensional plane. In other words, you cannot draw a setoid, nor represent it to yourself as a picture-thought. The thought of the stoic is a pure notion; a point that has no extension in space or time. Thus, a thought does not make contact with the objective living world of experiences. The thought cannot be said to have no existence, however, since it exists for consciousness as a comprehended, conceptual existence. The stoic works on it and produces better thoughts. Yet in doing this, he is literally not doing anything for those in the world to see.

Self-consciousness is a consciousness that relates to itself. Thus, it is a subject that relates to itself as subject. As we have mentioned on countless occasions, when self-consciousness thinks of itself, it repels itself from itself, and makes itself into an object for itself. Self-consciousness stands opposed to itself as object, yet remains self-same as subject. When self-consciousness makes itself into an object for itself, it makes itself into a thought. A thought, therefore, is self-consciousness presenting itself as object to itself as subject. Self-consciousness as object is wearing a disguise; it is disguised as a thought. Specifically, it is an essential thought for itself, a set. Notice also that self-consciousness repels itself from itself in thinking about itself. Self-consciousness divides itself from itself; it performs the activity of disjunction on itself. And in remaining aware that it remains subject in the same moment that it is an object to itself, self-consciousness unites itself with itself; it performs the activity of conjunction on itself. Finally, in making itself object to itself as subject, it negates itself as subject and becomes object; thus performing the activity of negation on itself. In being aware that it is still subject when it makes itself object for itself, self-consciousness negates itself as object and returns to being subject. These two negations just discussed operate on a single self-consciousness simultaneously, initiated by that same self-consciousness. Negation is a unary relation. Conjunction and disjunction are binary relations.

Don't worry Rangers. The math is over..maybe.

Thought as relation has been revealed to be the activity that self-consciousness performs on itself. Thought as material, or better yet, substance, is revealed to be self-consciousness in disguise. There is no difference between thought and self-consciousness; they are identical. Yet, thought is distinct from self-consciousness, where each stand opposed to one another, independent from each other. Since the thought of a stoic is a setoid, and hence cannot be represented in a form of picture-thought, self-consciousness too cannot be represented as a picture thought. Further, self-consciousness is an expression of infinity, the essence of life. Thought too is an expression of infinity, the essence of life, although in disguise. Again, the activity of thought is the unimpeded movement of self-consciousness. Henceforth, we shall regard thought and self-consciousness as being equivalent.

Self-consciousness, furthermore, is never uncertain as to whom a thought belongs to. My thought is eo ipso mine. When having a thought, self-consciousness immediately regards the thought as something that belongs to it. With a picture-thought, however, there must exist a slight delay, and hence a loss of certainty. Self-consciousness is an activity that cannot be pictured, so the material that generated the picture-thought cannot belong to self-consciousness. Self-consciousness cannot provide the material for the picture on its own, since self-consciousness is a pictureless entity. The picture-thought thus comes from somewhere else, i.e. the living objective world of appearances, or one's interaction with other living things, and other self-consciousnesses. Self-consciousness must take notice that its picture-thought is something that belongs to it; although it can never be certain that the thought belongs to it. Self-consciousness does not need to take this extra precaution for a pure conceptual thought.

In having revealed the true nature of a thought, we now see that in thinking, the self-consciousness places itself in a state of communion with itself, relating itself to itself in a tranquil state of equilibrium. The thought, even though it stands opposed to consciousness as an object distinct from it, the object was produced by self-consciousness repelling itself from itself, while remaining subject, and taking that repelled self to be an inert thought. This is true of thinking self-conscious in general, and a fortiori is true of the self-consciousness which takes the shape of a stoic. He remains in touch with himself, relieving himself of the tension of being in bondage. To think is a pleasurable experience. To produce refined thoughts relieves even more tension, since the more refined thought is a more refined self-consciousness. The finished thought product of the stoic, therefore, is the self-consciousness of the stoic himself. Self-consciousness, in itself and by itself, can be improved; the stoic is engaging in an activity of self-improvement, i.e. self-cultivation. He educates himself, and his education arises sui generis. It is the stoic that is the first to get a sense for himself of what we have just discussed.

The stoic is a thinking self-consciousness. Thought constitutes the realm in which the stoic dwells - a supersensible beyond that he constructs for himself. Since thought can refer to anything in the objective living world appearances, as we saw with the understanding, and the stoic produces many thoughts, eventually his mind's eye is covered with a web of thought-products; the stoic approaches life through a thought filter. It is as if he is wearing goggles that converts every kind of thing or situation into a thought. Since the stoic considers his own subordinate self-consciousness to be his own Absolute standard of truth, and since thoughts are equivalent to self-consciousness, the stoic considers his thought as an activity of relating, and thought as the substance which is related to be his own Absolute standard of truth. In his mind, the stoic has already deposed the lord. The stoic is no longer a recognizing self-consciousness like the bondsman was. Yet, in fact, the lord remains lord; fearing punishment, the stoic does not make it known to the lord of his deposition. Yet this deposition can only remain a dream for the stoic. For the lord, in fact, still has power over the life and death of the stoic self-consciousness. The stoic self-consciousness drags the shell of a bondsman to and fro, yet is the mind of an independent man; remaining content only with the things he has control over - his products. He refrains from revolting due to fear of punishment, and of violent death. The stoic must remain alive, for his self-consciousness is dependent on his living body in order to be an independent self-consciousness at all.

More wise words from another stoic.

It must be remarked that in the history of the human species, stoics were responsible for the development of propositional logic, or sentential logic; this development was an advancement and improvement of Aristotelian syllogistic logic. Aristotle's logic was the first systematic account of the system of logic, so stoics developed their thoughts to a systematic level. How this development could have been possible is discussed above in detail. No stoic lets a thought pass through his self-conscious awareness unexamined, especially if it is a picture thought. Epictetus himself taught logic.

We have shown that thought is revealed to be the immediate activity of self-consciousness in general, and a fortiori, the stoic self-consciousness. The stoic finds his independence, in tranquil communion with himself, only in thought. Thought, being identical to consciousness, is an expression of infinity, the essence of life. It is difference that is no difference; thought is a self-same that is repelled from the self-same infinity. In complete and perfect harmony, both thought and infinity, as the self-same, repels itself from itself; and simultaneously, that which is repelled is self-attractive. Thought has inherited a perfect copy of the movement, and repose, of infinity. The stoic no longer needs to produce physical finished products for its own sake; now he produces the product only to administer to the desires of the lord, so that the stoic may not have to face punishment up to and including violent death.

The self-consciousness of the stoic, which also harmoniously exhibits this character of infinity and thought, being identical to them, is independent only in the confines of the stoic's mind. The self-consciousness of the stoic is independent only in thought; thought is the infinite movement of self-consciousness, and self-consciousness has the independence to think any thought. The self-consciousness of the stoic has the independence to think his own self-consciousness, since self-consciousness is a thought. In other words, thinking about self-consciousness is an independent act. Again, self-consciousness has the independence to think, i.e. to set into motion or to cease from motion, any thought. Thus, the thought of thought is an independent act. The stoic, just like any thinking self-consciousness, can think thoughts about thoughts.

Self-consciousness can further think about itself thinking thoughts about thoughts. This can go on for infinity, with an infinitely variety of permutations. Nothing prevents self-consciousness from thinking what it wants; not only does the self-consciousness of the stoic find independence in his thoughts, he finds absolute freedom. Self-consciousness can think thoughts about self-consciousness. Also, self-consciousness is aware of those thoughts as its own. Combining the previous two statements, the stoic produces one its finest thought products: the thought of self-consciousness and the self-consciousness of thought is the will. Self-consciousness is a will; self-consciousness, being an activity as well is an inert being, both is a will that wills. Since self-consciousness is absolutely free in thought, and self-consciousness is a will that wills, the stoic realizes that he has a free will to set into motion, or to cease the motion, of any thought.

For the first time, self-consciousness recognizes free will for what it is. Its thought of free will corresponds perfectly to the way free will actually is. Self-consciousness had a vague awareness of its free will, calling it independence. Free will is what self-consciousness meant to say when he referred to independence. The stoic has free will, a finished thought product, and the lord cannot take it away from him and consume it. We have been shown a demonstration of how exactly the stoic fashions for himself finished thought-products. At no point do these thought products become an alien external reality for the stoic, as did the finished product of the bondsman.

The stoic is free to use his thought, and the thought-products of his thought-work and thought-labor. Three of those products are the thoughts of conjunction, disjunction, and negation. A man who was named Chrysippus, a stoic, in during the course of the development of the self-consciousness of the human species (which we will henceforth refer to as history), developed the propositional logic. The stoic combined the negation and disjunction thoughts, along with other thoughts that referred to what he took to be inert substances, and captured the material conditional, i.e. the "if...then..." statement, as a refined thought. He combined two material conditionals to capture the biconditional, i.e. the "...if and only if..." statement, as a refined thought. Along with other thought-products, the stoic in this way developed a system of formal logic.

Having done so, the stoic became better at informal logic, at arguing logically. Now, the stoic can have thoughts and justify them. Further, he can justify his justifications. He only harbors thoughts that are justifiable, and hence is said to be reasonable. The true and good, for the self-consciousness of the stoic, is the self-consciousness of the stoic. As a thinking self-consciousness, the stoic communes with his self-consciousness through thinking thoughts. Thoughts are self-consciousness in disguise, thus the good and true for the stoic are his thoughts. Further, since the stoic only harbors justifiable thoughts, making both him and his thoughts reasonable, the good and true is that which is reasonable.

The Stoic and the Material World 

Having also refined the concepts of cause and effect for himself, which consciousness first caught sight of in the shape of the understanding, the self-consciousness of the stoic gazes upon cause and effect in complete clarity. Cause and effect occur in the living objective world of the appearances, the external world which the stoic refers to using the refined thought of "material", calling it the material world. The material in the material world is in a dance of causes and effects. Cause exists only in the material world; hence cause is only what the stoic refers to as efficient cause. Material in the material world brings about motion or ceases motion in only another material. That other material is the effect, which exists only in the material world. The stoic is engaging in the same explanation that the understanding engaged in. The stoic endeavors to produce as many thought-products as is possible for him to refer to different kinds of material and the relations between them. The stoic uses these thoughts to explain cause and effect in this manner.

The stoic maintains that the free will is not material, since it cannot be found in the material world. As we have shown, you cannot even draw the free will; nor can you represent it to yourself as a picture-thought. The free will is immaterial, and hence cannot be an efficient cause. Immaterial things, by the stoic's own definition, cannot be efficient causes. The free will cannot bring about effects, neither bring about motions nor cease motions, in the material world. This is to say that anything in the material world that happens happens regardless of the input of the free will. The material world is an independent system of cause and effects, opposed and indifferent to the free will of the stoic. Thus, the stoic subscribes to a determinism. We commit the true Scotsman fallacy on purpose, and hold that a truly reasonable stoic can only argue for a hard determinism.

Yet, notice what has happened here. The free will was supposed to be free. The self-consciousness of the stoic is free to think in an infinite variety of ways without constraint without, except that of justifiability, without consequence; this is not just any kind of freedom. It is supposed to be absolute freedom. At the same time, he accepts the material world as a system of causes and effects for what it is - indeed, he could not change anything about the material world even if he wanted to. The free will is the finest refined thought product of the stoic's thought labor. Thoughts, being in truth self-consciousness, do not make contact with the material world. Thoughts alone cannot make material substances move, or stop material substances from moving. Now, notice again that you cannot even a picture of a thought, because a thought is a setoid, as we have seen; so you can't think a picture-thought of a pure thought. Thus, a thought is not an extended thing in real space and time. You can only have picture-thoughts of things extended from a central point (which need not occupy the true center of a particular object) in real space and time. I am referring to what has been called physical flux. The stoic's thought, being something that is not in the material world, cannot ever be an efficient cause. The free will, which is a refined thought, a fortiori can in no way initiate or cease motion in the material world. The stoic is free to think, but he is not free to change anything about the world whatsoever. This is a type of restraint which the material world imposes on the stoic, yet it is more severe than any kind of limitation that the lord could ever impose on his bondsman - even a totalitarian lord with the help of modern communications and surveillance technology. The stoic is not absolutely free like he was supposed to be, in actual fact in his material world, but in absolute bondage - not absolute freedom. Even using his own terms, we can force the stoic to concede that his free will is an illusion. It is a silly plaything, and an elaborate illusion. The stoic only has the thought about what freedom is, not the living reality of being free.

We derived this inference using the same methods of argumentation that the stoic himself would have used if he were in our position, knowing what we know; the same methods that he developed and refined. The stoic would be forced to consider us, in his own terms, to be reasonable, true and good. We can go further, and using his own thought-products we can enchain him him in a type of bondage that is beyond absolute bondage - beyond the limits of the possible. The stoic has a body, which is extended in real space and time from a central point. He can think a picture-thought of his own body. A physical body is not a pure thought, but something that exists in the material world. Remember that in not being a pure thought, the stoic must remind himself that the body is his. This happens in almost an instant, but not exactly an instant. The stoic's body, he must concede, exists in the material world. The body of the stoic can bring effects about in the material world, and so, it can act as an efficient cause. The stoic knows this, for he restrains his body from revolting against his lord. Yet, self-restraint originates from the activity of the self-consciousness of the stoic; self-restraint is the expression of the stoic's independence. The stoic is free to restrain to himself, and indeed, he does. The living reality of being free exists for the stoic only in his capacity to restrain himself.

Consider again, however, that the body of the stoic is extended in space. The free will is a refined thought-produce of the stoic; its just a fancy thought. A fancy thought is still a thought. No thought can make contact with anything in the material world; hence no fancy thought can make contact with anything in the material world. No fancy thought can initiate or cease motion in the material world. Free will cannot make contact with anything in the material world. The body of the stoic is in the material world; the body is itself material. Therefore, the free will of the stoic, not being able to make contact with anything in the material world, cannot make contact with his body. The stoic cannot even control his own body with his free will. He cannot make his own body move, nor stop it from moving. But even restraint is a type of control. Restraint is the cessation of motion. It is an efficient cause. But, on the other hand, the self-restraint of the stoic originates from his free will. It is just as illusory as his free will. Restraint from the will is immaterial. The self-restraint of the stoic is just another thought-product. If the stoic's finger wants to scratch, it will scratch, regardless of whether or not the stoic wishes to restrain it.

This problem has not really gone away. We have just figured out fancier ways to describe the same thing.

The stoic does not restrain himself truly. His body allows him to restrain himself, and tricks him into thinking that the restraint, which as an efficient cause can only belong to another efficient cause, i.e. a body. The stoic only believes that he restrained himself because his body has fooled him into believing. Therefore, the stoic cannot truly be independent, because only through self-restraint did the bondsman become, in fashioning a finished product to satisfy the lord, aware of his independence. The stoic inherited that awareness from the bondsman. But we have shown, using the very thought-products that the stoic developed, that the stoic is not even independent. If this is true, then the bondsman was never independent. His surrender in the struggle for life and death was fated to occur. Even all the things that happened during the course of his history are pre-determined. This can go back all the way to the very beginning of his existence as mere sense-certainty. All of every movement of the material world, including his body, was destined to happen, even to a single scratch, and consciousness could have done nothing to avoid what has happened to it. Consciousness is a victim. There is such thing as true victimhood. All are victims of circumstance. No one is responsible for anything. Thus, nothing is the fault of the stoic. He doesn't even have to take responsibility for his actions. We have discovered that responsibility is dependent on the independence of self-consciousness. Yet it is precisely the acceptance of responsibility that makes one independent. Again, the same kind of process that we saw in the thing and its many properties, force, and others, is occurring. We shall leave it at this for now. We shall discuss responsibility when we begin our discussion of the Philosophy of Right.

That being said, free will is his fanciest thought-product. But the stoic himself developed the thought and the term (for the human species it was libera volunta) for the purposes of expressing to himself his own independence which he thought that he had. Thinking through the thought term, free will, and what it would look like alongside the stoic's other thought term, the deterministic material world, we see that there is tension between those thoughts, which to this day has not been resolved. Let us leave this paradox for now, and return to it once we discuss the feelings and emotions of the stoic.

The Feelings and Emotions of the Stoic 

Suppose for now that the stoic really can restrain his feelings and emotions with his will alone. He is not being tricked by his body. It is first necessary, however, to make a distinction between the feelings and emotions of the stoic. As we have already discussed, feelings are a kind of movement that consciousness senses. However, feelings do not originate in the objective living world of appearances. The particular immediacy that sense-certainty senses, which originates from the objective living world of appearances, is referred to as sensation. Feeling does not originate in the object of sense-certainty. Recall that we assumed at first that the activity of knowing is distinct from the object of knowing. If feeling does not originate from the object of sense certainty, then feeling originates in the activity of sense-certainty itself. But sense-certainty is just a shape of consciousness. It follows that feeling originates in the activity of consciousness itself. Since consciousness must still sense in order to perceive, understand, be self-aware, desire, etc., it follows that feeling remains with consciousness throughout its development (which we have referred to, peripherally, as tension).

We said that consciousness feels pain, when the activity of consciousness is in tension with itself or its object. This kind of tension can arise in any kind of manner, and is usually accompanied by doubt and loss of certainty. Certainty is the absence of doubt; it was the state where consciousness was in a state of equilibrium with its object, as well as a state where consciousness conception of the object corresponded to how the object actually was in fact. When sense-certainty's conception of the object was questioned, it was discovered that its conception of the immediate particular object did not correspond to how the object turned out to be, a mediated universal. Indeed, the loss of certainty for sense-certainty was the first instance in which consciousness felt pain. The loss of certainty an ultimate and supreme source of feeling. Sense-certainty, in feeling pain, wished to relieve itself, and regain its certainty, inducing it to shift to its second sub-shape. Having shifted to its new sub-shape, the activity of sense-certainty regained its certainty, In realizing its error, sense-certainty had lost its state of equilibrium with the object; it attempted to regain the correspondence of its conception of the object and the object as it was in fact by forming a new conception. Developing this new conception, and relieving its pain, sense-certainty felt pleasure.

Here is an example of what that spectrum might look like.

After sense-certainty, more situations in which sense-certainty lost its certainty arose, and the source of consciousness' new tensions were as numerous as those situations. New feelings arose, which we have not yet named, which are a mean between pain and pleasure. The types of feelings that exist are various in degree between pain and pleasure. Pain and pleasure themselves are experienced in a variety of degrees.

Recall that death is the loss of consciousness, and just before the moment of death, it is accompanied by pain. Self-consciousness fears violent death. Fear is referred to as an emotion. The fear of violent death, as well as non-violent death, is the fear of the loss of consciousness. The loss of consciousness is not possible, since consciousness springs from infinity, which is itself subject, and is thus an activity of consciousness. Infinity is indestructible. It is immortal. It is rather the loss of one's unique individuality that is feared, i.e. the loss of one's own self-relatedness to himself as an individual so far as he knows himself, being-for-self. The fear of death is the fear of the loss of being-for-self. But sense-certainty, was at first certain of itself; it was in a state of harmonious, tranquil, equilibrium. It was undisturbed in relating to itself. Its being-for-self was undisturbed. Pain results from the disturbance of consciousness' being-for-self. Fear is the fear of losing, and not regaining, being-for-self. It follows that fear is a response to pain. Since fear is an emotion, and pain is a feeling, it follows that emotions are a response to feelings. In other words, feelings bring about emotions.

Fear brings about an effect, namely, emotion. Fear sets emotion into motion. It follows that feeling is what the stoic calls an efficient cause. It can also be said that emotions bring about feelings. Emotion and feeling, like force, are both a kind of cause and effect. Yet, emotions and feelings, as we have seen, are both pure activities of consciousness. If an individual consciousness, and hence self-consciousness, were to have remain a being-for-self with no living body, it would still experience emotion and feelings just like consciousnesses, and self-consciousnesses, that do have living bodies. We have already mentioned that the stoic cannot control what he feels. In his own terms, since he cannot control what happens in the material world, he cannot control what happens to him that disturbs his state of tranquil relating of self to self. When this happens, he feels fear. By the stoic's own terms, supposing that he can really restrain himself, the stoic cannot control his feelings. His feelings impinge on his senses without his consent. He is not free to feel what he wants to feel.

The stoic does not restrain his feelings. He does, however, restrain his emotions. Stoic restraint is the restraint of emotion. Thus, the stoic is unmoved by feelings of pain, pleasure, or any other kind of feeling. He makes himself a shell of complete tranquility, yet beneath it is a storm. And, indeed, the stoic does restrain his emotions in actual fact, because as we have already shown from our own assumptions and our discoveries during the course of consciousness' journey towards absolute knowing, both restraint and emotion are pure activities of consciousness. Thus, the free will of the stoic does have the power to restrain his emotions, despite what the terms of the stoic allow him to think. Hard determinism, therefore, is an erroneous concept. The material world is not completely deterministic. It is a thought-product that contains an error. Where did the error occur?

Gotcha

The stoic finds himself having two thoughts, about the same thing, at the same time, which cannot both be true at the same time. On the one hand, his free will is free to restrain his emotions, because that is what the stoic does in fact. On the other, his free will is not free to restrain his emotions. This is the inference that we must accept if we follow the stoic's own line of reasoning. But this line of reasoning is just one thought that leads to another, helped along by a system of reasoning, logic, that is itself a collection of thoughts. Thoughts do not make contact with the objective world of experiences. Thus, the error occurred in the thoughts of the bondsman. Specifically, it is the thought-product that the term "material" refers to that is in error. The activity of consciousness cannot be material, while the world is. Either both the activity of self-consciousness and the living objective world of appearances are material, or neither are. The types of words one uses, and the meanings that they have, have huge consequences on the way one thinks and behaves.

Further, the stoic is thinking one thing and doing another. His thought and his action are not in line, therefore in tension. It appears that thinking by itself cannot put the stoic at ease with engaging in actions to bring about real change in the external world that would put him at ease. Yet this is the one thing the stoic refuses to do, for he would risk his life in overthrowing his lord, and risk having to endure a violent death. The fear of death, and of having to act to change the world in order to bring about a situation that would relieve one's pain, is the cause of the tension between free will and determinism. The stoic does not see this, although he has a sense of disharmony between his thoughts and actions. The pain which springs from this disharmony is accompanied by a stoic dissatisfaction.

The stoic cannot depose his lord; he has only deposed his lord in his mind. He does not recognize the self-consciousness of the lord as his Absolute standard of truth, his being-in-itself. Self-consciousness which takes the shape of the stoic is not a recognizing self-consciousness, like the bondsman. The functions of the bondsman, of administering to the life of the lord, are the inheritance that burdens the stoic. He is a free self-consciousness, a free will, only in his mind. He is not living the living reality of freedom. He can only attain this reality if he deposes the lord, and therefore, risk life and death.

The Unfortunate Stoic

But the stoic, in being shaken in every fibre of his being to its very roots by the fear of violent death, refuses to risk life and death. His most beautiful thought-product, free-will, corresponds to something that is real in a precise manner. Free will is real; it is the thought of self-consciousness and the self-consciousness of thought. Thought and self-consciousness have an actual and self-sustaining existence, since both are expressions of the ultimate immortal being, infinity. Free will is made of components that stand independently opposed to one another, and to infinity, yet all form a unity. Free will is an actual and self-sustaining state of self-consciousness. Like force proper, it must express itself; free will expresses itself in the following manner: the stoic is free in actual fact. Having a free will implies having the ability to set into motion a choice. Equally, free will is the ability to cease that which choice which as been set into motion; it can change its mind.

In exercising choice, the stoic has free will; since free will must express itself, the stoic self-consciousness must make a choice. His will will set into motion a series of forces, which culminate into a series of circumstances, situations, different configurations of self-consciousness, as well as different configurations of the relationship between those configurations of self-consciousness and the objective world, which extends far into space and time, that result as a consequences of that choice. All this originates from his free will's capacity to make that choice. Given that the stoic refrains from acting or feeling due to his social circumstances of being bound to a lord who has the power of life and death over him, the choice cannot involve any type of action that would change those circumstances. Otherwise, the stoic risks death. The stoic's choice cannot be something that sets into motion anything that exists in what he calls the material world. The stoic's choice can only be directed inward, at the state of his very own activity of consciousness.

The path towards absolute knowing splits.

Free will is directed at itself, and the stoic has the free will to allow his free will to express itself, or to cease it from expressing itself. Whatever choice he makes, henceforth, the stoic is no longer an animal that automatically and necessarily reacts to stimuli. Thus, whatever the outcome, the stoic assumes a new shape of self-consciousness. With the first choice, we have the stoic who has the free will to allow his free will to express itself. That stoic, for reasons which will be made clear below, is the fortunate stoic. With the second choice, we have a stoic who has the free will to cease his free will from expressing itself. That stoic, for reasons which will be made clear below, is the unfortunate stoic.

Yet, both choices must be enacted; otherwise, free will is not free. If only the first choice is enacted, and not the second, the free will of the stoic is not a real and living actual freedom. If only the second choice is enacted, and not the first, again the free will of the stoic is not a real and living actual freedom. Thus both choices are enacted, and since there is nothing in our axioms, and nothing about the development of self-consciousness thus far, to suggest that one choice is made after another (there is a temporal delay between the moments in which these choices are made), it follows that this choice is made simultaneously. Further, the choice is made simultaneously in a single individual, for reasons already stated in this paragraph. Once having realized this, the self-consciousness of the stoic immediately splits into two self-consciousnesses while still in a living body. While it is two distinct self-consciousnesses, it is the same singular self-consciousness from which they sprung.

The one is the fortunate self-consciousness of the stoic, the other is the unfortunate self-consciousness of the stoic. They both belong to the same living body. The body endures for as long as a body does, and by the life-process, it must pass away. Yet, this self-consciousness, attached to infinity, with composition acquired from its development remaining undisturbed, remains split into two self-consciousnesses that stand opposed and independent from one another, yet are still one. They are, so to speak, soulmates. These self-consciousness, since each is an independent being-for-self in their own right, and since neither is distinct from unsplit self-consciousnesses other than their being split, acquire each for themselves distinct living bodies, separated by space and time. Now, there is nothing in our axioms, or in the course of the development of self-consciousness thus far, to suggest that there must be a delay between the final breath of the body which both self-consciousnesses shared, and the first breath of the bodies which both self-consciousnesses now inhabit. Thus, the change is immediate.

It gets weirder.

The nature of each body, and the life it is to lead, is a consequence of that choice regarding the free will directed at itself that the stoic made. The unfortunate stoic chose to cease his free will from expressing itself. Thus, he is born still in absolute bondage. In not allowing to his free will to express itself, he reinforces that bondage. The fortunate stoic chose to allow his free will to express itself. His life will be different from the first. Such is the nature of the transcendental choice in the transmigration of the soul. The fortunate stoic, in allowing his free will to express itself into the actual living world, is different from the unified self-consciousness of the stoic whence it originated. It has changed in a fundamental sense. While born in bondage, he has to go through the entire development of self-consciousness in the course of growing up from childhood to adulthood, he is released from his bounds. Why this happens shall be made clear below.

The unfortunate stoic, in forbidding his free will to express itself into the actual living world, remains with a free will which is not a living reality. Thus, nothing changes about him. He is still utterly shaken by the fear of violent death. His thoughts, and his living reality remain in utter contradiction. The unfortunate stoic is still in absolute bondage. He still holds thought-products, which if he thought them through, would necessarily lead to the conclusion that his is not even free to direct his own will, or to direct his own living body. The source of this choice his insistence on clinging to his thought-products, for it is only his thought products that give him independence. Further, he is shaken by the fear of violent death. He is a hard determinist, and refuses to yield that the world is what it is, and that he cannot act upon it. He is independent only in and through his thoughts, and he clings steadfastly to to this false kind of independence, which even he cannot support if compelled to. He would have to concede that his free will is a facade, and that he is at the mercy of the system of efficient causes in the material world. Yet, he thinks he has free will, and futilely behaves as if he does. His actions do not correspond to this thoughts.

In his mind, his thoughts do not make contact with his material world. Now, the stoic cannot justify for himself having to undergo violent death; therefore violent death is unjustifiable, and hence, unreasonable. His body, being part of the material world, is something that causes in the efficient sense. His brings about an effect, which is itself a cause. One effect that the stoic cannot use his body for is violent death. The cause of his violent death can be anything that causes about his lord to bring that effect. He could exhibit to the lord signs of independence and risk death, or he could not, and save his own life. Wanting to be free, he slavishly clings to life. Wanting to live nobly, he lives vulgarly. His thoughts and his actions are tragically divided; by the same token, his intentions and the living reality of his life situation do not align. In the history of homo sapiens, the figure that corresponds is Seneca the Younger.

This face is mistakenly attributed to being the face of Seneca, yet it captures the expression on the face of an unfortunate stoic. It gazes into a beyond in deep thought, yet is animated by deep fear, and mangled by his unfortunate circumstances in life.

The fortunate stoic, in allowing his free will to express itself into the actual living world, rather than cling safely to his thought-products as did the unfortunate stoic, lets go. He lets go of the hard determinism of the material world, and instead allows for a soft determinism. But soft determinism cannot be supported by the thought-products of the stoic. For the unified self-consciousness of the stoic whence the fortunate stoic sprung, such a notion would be unjustifiable, unreasonable, and hence, neither good nor true. It is no different from violent death. Thus, in letting go of its thought products, he lets go of the concrete thought-independence that he can only secure with his thought products. He has done something courageous. In doing so, he allows himself to contradict himself in order to save himself from self-contradiction.Thus, he surrenders one kind of independence, yet in doing so attains a true independence and self-subsisting independence that exists only the deepest confines of his self-consciousness. This kind of independence is of a different kind than the first, due to its being a living reality; yet it has not yet expressed itself in the actual world. Further, the fortunate stoic has indeed deposed a lord, yet not the lord against whom he surrendered in the struggle for life and death. This lord also has the power of life and death over the stoic; it commands the stoic from doing some things, and restricts it from doing other things. This deposed lord is the very self-consciousness of the fortunate stoic. Yet this self-consciousness is the stoic himself. He divests himself of his capacity to think for himself; he has surrendered that mind of his own which he developed. Thus he is free to not obey himself. Also, he has divested himself of the capacity to obey himself in the first place, since it is he himself who was shaken by the fear of violent death. It was he himself who commanded himself to fear violent death, and thus remain in chains. Thus, the fortunate stoic is triply independent: from his desires, himself as being-for-another, himself as being-for-self.

This type independence is beyond what is possible for a normal self-consciousness to achieve transcendent. It is in fact the hidden secret path that leads towards the supersensible beyond, and towards the throne of the alpha and the omega, infinity. His independence is absolute and divine. His triple independence surpasses even the doubled independence of the lord of lords, i.e. emperors, of kingdoms in the objective living world of appearances. The fortunate stoic is no longer simply an animal. He is closer to a god who inhabits the living body of an animal. He is born in a new body, taking his first breath in his new body immediately after the last breath left his old body, knowing only what has resulted from his development up to that point from sense-certainty, i.e. still thinking that he is in bondage. Yet, his nature has compelled the the lord of whom he was afraid to disappear. He lives a living reality of freedom. Thus, on the one hand, he is free to act however he pleases, yet he cannot act as he pleases, since he does not know how. Acting as one pleases is a true living independence from one's desires, as well as from one's lord. He has never experienced this kind of situation in the course of his development. He behaves just as if he was a bondsman. Yet, his inner transcendent freedom, as well as the living reality of independence which previously only the lord knew, destines this fortunate stoic self-consciousness to take the reigns of a lord of lords. He should rule the world like a god, a philosopher king; but the world cannot be ruled by one who is not understood. The historical figure in the world history of homo sapiens that corresponds to this figure is the emperor Marcus Aurelius.

Indeed, Lord Emperor. 

These two stoic self-consciousnesses will not unite again into a single self-consciousness until both reach the end of the development of self-consciousness on the path towards absolute knowing, and both stand at the door of absolute knowing. Neither will be able to open it until they unite once again into a single self-consciousness, and open it together. The rest of the journey for self-consciousness which we shall undertake is the account of how these two stoic self-consciousnesses unite. They will engage in a dance, with each step perfectly executed as mirror images of the other; their fingers will only make contact when both attain perfect harmony within themselves, reaching the extreme of pure a tranquil, pleasant, harmonious self-relatedness which every Buddhist monk struggles to achieve - pure being-for-self. In each having attained their being-for-self, just as we saw with the thing of perception, the distinctiveness of each of their being-self reveals that they are related to the other. Their related-to-otherness and their being-for-another, will become for each a living reality; the two will become one again.

Nice way to express the kind of movement involved concisely.

For now, they are a divided self-consciousness, living separate lives as two separate self-consciousnesses reciprocally related to each other, one independent from the other, one the complete polar opposite of the other. It is only until this difference is reconciled that they will re-unite, and regain that unified self-consciousness which they lost. Yet, we must go through the movement of each in their turn, where-ever it might lead us; we must keep firmly in mind that each must exist in strict reciprocality. We must recall this, because Hegel only traces the movement of one of these self-consciousnesses. We can take comfort in knowing that, since they are one, by the inverted law, they are self-attractive; hence, if we consider each to be like two distinct points on a straight line, they pull each other towards the exact midpoint of that line, at the point of bisection. They start at polar opposites of each other: one supremely blessed, the other supremely wretched. Each are pulled towards the center; thus, despite being in a strictly reciprocal relationship, they will be similar in some respects. Those respects in which they are similar correspond only to that midpoint, the point of fusion, since they have nothing in common except that one unique midpoint, and provide the clue for us in determining the nature of the fused self-consciousness.