Reason: On Kantian Idealism; On the Metaphysically Necessary Conditions of Rationality

Reason

Introduction

Self-consciousness has become Reason. Having succeeded in reconciling itself as changeable and itself as unchangeable consciousness through the mediation of genuine thought, self-consciousness, as a particular consciousness inhabitting a living body in the flux of appearances, discovers that it itself as a self is the principle unity that determines the nature of reality. Self-consciousness must now provide an account for how this could be possible. Its certainty that it is all reality is true, but only in principle. It must show, rationally, that the principle root, the universal substrate of all reality, is itself. In other words, thought and action for Reason is Absolute, in principle. Thought, and willing, is confined to a particular individual, constrained within the limits of a living body that preserves itself and decays; in principle, its thought is universal. It applies to all things, in principle. Reason holds the conviction that all things are knowable, being is intelligible, as Plato remarked. Similarly, action is in fact confined to a particular individual living body, but is in principle universal; i.e. the effects of its acts ripple to the limits of being, turn inside out (they are inverted) and return to the initiating agent of said act.

The unhappy consciousness, recall, was aware of its internal self-contradictory nature; it was both changeable and unchangeable, but neither. These two poles it could not reconcile without the devotion, the self-feeling derived therefrom, and the self-surrender of desire through work, with the help of a mediator. With the mediator, who played flesh-image representative of genuine thought, the unhappy consciousness divested itself of inner and outer freedom. This divestment resulted in the actualization of what the unhappy consciousness all along thought itself to be: it became a thing. Once having experienced the life of a thing, the unhappy consciousness realized that it could not divest itself of the universality inherent in its self-hood, for even a thing and its many properties is a universal. 

Reason emerged as the self-consciousness that is certain of the implicit universality of its self-hood. The fundamental and necessary assumption that makes self-consciousness Reason is its instinctive conviction that it itself is the universal substrate of both itself as subject, and the objective flux of appearances as substance. The objective flux of appearances, as well as itself, operates in perfect harmony to the activity of self-consciousness as Reason, like an octave. The world is inherently rational. Reason, furthermore, is at peace with itself. No longer does the otherness of objective reality require cancellation, its being consumed or rendered into a product, whether of thought or physical. No longer does self-consciousness, like the stoic, extract its thoughts from objective actuality, then, once the thought has been made, casts objective reality aside like an empty husk devoid of rational significance. 

Actuality is an independent and self-related permanence that possesses truth and presence. It is distinct from self-consciousness, which itself is an independent and self-related permanence that possesses truth and presence. In each of their independent self-relation, Reason and the innately rational world are related to each other; both are being-for-another. Thus, they are absolutely distinct being-for-self. The rationality of both unites them. Again, as we have seen, Reason interprets objective reality as it interprets itself. In essence, Reason engages in an interpretive stance known as (ontological idealism), which holds that reality is a form of thought and the thought of self-consciousness participates in it. 

Idealism proper can defined as "the belief in a spiritual principle at the basis of reality, without the reduction of the physical world to mere illusion"; in all its forms, idealism, has two fundamental, axiomatic, assumptions. First, something mental is the ultimate foundation of all reality, or even exhaustive of all reality. Second, even though the existence of something independent of the mind is conceded, everything that self-consciousness can (know) about this mind independent reality, (all claims to knowledge), must be considered to be a form of self-knowledge. Reality is permeated by the creative, formative, and constructive activities of the mind. Immanuel Kant holds this kind of rational, idealist, attitude, that our representations of space and time are not copies of independent vector spaces, but determinations that fundamentally belonged to the mind of self-consciousness. 

The self is the universal substance. Rather than the sun orbiting the spectator on earth, the spectator on earth orbits the sun. The ultimate and inexhaustive foundation of all reality is a universal unchangeable consciousness, pure and simple. The ontological idealism of self-consciousness is supplemented by an epistemological idealism. Self-consciousness can make itself into an object for itself, it differentiates itself from itself and remains self-identical in thinking itself. The thought of itself is the Category, and this thought product is taken to be the universal substrate of reality. Reason holds that the structure of self-consciousness ineluctibly determines the structure of all reality, inner and outer. Thus, thought too is formal, rational, since its source is self-consciousness. 

The Category

Both self-consciousness and objective reality, distinct and independent, are nevertheless related by the same identical essence, which is self-consciousness. This fundamental self-consciousness is absolutely, and unchangeably, self-related being-for-self. This absolute self-unity, in order to be a distinct and distinguishable unity, contains self-differentiation, like the thing and its many properties. In other words, the self and the thought product Category that expresses it is determinate. Its determinateness necessitates the presence of other selves and categories alike. Thus, there exist a multiplicity of rational selves and categories. We shall only concern ourselves with the multiplicity of categories inhering in a singular self, for every self navigates through reality with its own set of mass produced thought products, categories. We have covered these categories already in the, as of yet incomplete, section on Newtonian mechanics.

The self-conscious gaze of Reason oscillates restlessly between the particularities of objective reality which it apprehends via its senses and perception, with diverse sense-data expressed by the multiplicity of categories, and the tranquil unity of self-consciousness expressed by the single universal category - which is supposed to be the universal substrate of all inner and outer reality. When it oscillates restlessly, self-consciousness is utterly distinct from the tranquil unity it is supposed to be in; the converse is true. It treats the multiplicity of its categories with which is supposed to grasp something alien in the external world of appearances as if possessed a genuine, independent objectivity. 

Reason must provide a rational and sufficient account for how it is possible for it as self-conscious Reason to grasp objective reality rationally, while preserving the independence of objective reality, accounting for it in its totality independent of the effects of the activity of self-consciousness. That self-consciousnes ineluctably determines the structure is necessary to account for why self-consiousness is capable of rationally grasping an utterly distinct objective reality, this account is not sufficient to account for how self-consciousness is capable of rationally comprehending objective external actuality objectively. Either reason genuinely grasps an alien and objective external actuality via its multiple categories, or it grasps at the empty clouds of dreams which pass for the light of waking reality.

Thus, we have arrived at the motivating premise, and conclusion, of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason:

"We here propose to do just what Copernicus did in attempting to explain the celestial movements. When he found that he could make no progress by assuming that all the heavenly bodies revolved round the spectator, he reversed the process, and tried the experiment of assuming that the spectator revolved, while the stars remained at rest. We may make the same experiment with regard to the intuition of objects. If the intuition must conform to the nature of objects, I do not see how we can know anything about that nature a priori. If, on the other hand, the object (qua subject of the senses) conforms to the nature of our faculty of intuition, I can easily conceive the possibility of such an a priori knowledge." Preface to the Second Edition

Self-consciousness experiences external reality filtered through the categories, according to Kant. But as we have already stated, Kant can only show that self-consciousness represents the categories to itself as objects. He cannot show that these thought objects grasp, in their turn, the true mind-independent objects of external reality, the unconditioned thing-in-itself. Any object, once it is thought, loses its unconditioned state of being mind-independent. We are, of course, referring to the observer effect mentioned in the first article. Kant acknowledged this difficulty:

"For we come to the conclusion that our faculty of knowledge is unable to transcend the limits of possible experience; and yet this is precisely the most essential object of this science...For that which of necessity impels us to transcend the limits of experience and of all appearances, is the unconditioned, which reason absolutely requires in things as they are in themselves...Now, if it appears that when,..., we assume that our knowledge conforms to its objects as things in themselves, the unconditioned cannot be thought without contradiction, and that when, on the other hand, we assume that our representation of things as they are given to us does not conform to these things as they are in themselves, but that these objects, as appearances, conform our mode of representation [via the categories], the contradiction disappears: we shall then be convinced of the truth of that which we began by assuming for the sake of experiment; we may look upon it as established that the unconditioned does not lie in things as we know them, or as they are given to us, but in things as they are in themselves, beyond the range of our knowledge."

It is on these grounds that Kant holds that no knowledge can be had about things beyond what can be affirmed by the sense experience, and perception, of self-consciousness; the metaphysics of Aristotle, as well as theology, are fundamentally flawed. However, self-consciousness as Reason, i.e. Kant, cannot demonstrate the unconditional mind-independent externality of ordinary sensual experience of self-consciousness either. Reason, unaware of the trap it has set for itself, sets out to provide a sufficient account for how self-consciousness is able to grasp external actuality by means the schema.

The Schema

Reason conflates the objective, mind-dependent category with the objective external reality that category is supposed to grasp. At one time, Reason is a restless oscillation between categories, while simultaneously being a tranquil unity certain of its being the basis of all reality, proclaiming each category as being distinct from the external objects they are supposed to grasp, then asserting its self-certitude of being the basis of all reality by identifying and conflating the previously distinct category and external alien object. The category is not the real, unconditioned, external object of experience, but a thought product derived from it - an abstraction.

An abstraction can grasp nothing more than another abstraction, hence, even the sense impressions that self-consciousness senses and perceives have no reality on their own account, but are the solipsistic, dogmatic creations of self-consciousness. But, Kant, as Reason, wants to claim the opposite - that the sense-impressions it receives through the categories have a mind-independent, abiding, empirical, reality. It assigns to the schema the task of sufficiently accounting for the metamorphosis of the unconditioned external reality to the category.

A schema, in Kantian philosophy, is the procedural rule by which a category or pure, non-empirical, concept is associated with a sense impression by means of a series of ineluctible steps, where a subjective intuition of empirical sense impressions is discursively ascribed as a representation of an external mind-independent object. But the sense impressions qua sense impressions belong to consciousness, and so are categories, thought products, masquerading as real external objects.

Reason ignores this discrepancy, but notices that the unifying element from the first to final step of the schema is a unified and tranquil self-consciousness. Self-consciousness, taking itself to be the universal substrate of all reality, ascribes to the ontology of transcendental idealism. Simultaneously, Reason ignores itself as a unifying element of every step involved in the schema, and notices the discrepancy involved in the relation between category and sense impressions, oscillating restlessly among the varigated categorical content which is a one time conditioned by thought, another time unconditioned. Self-consciousness ascribes to empiricism - every concept that is knowable must be verifiable by mind independent experiences.

The Empirically Idealistic Consciousness

That self-consciousness is able to entertain both idealism and empiricism as rational accounts of external reality is a sign of its incoherence. Its supposed philosophizing is nothing more than empty and abstract rambling, producing concepts that do not correspond to the external reality they profess to account for. Reason shifts from restless empiricism to tranquil idealism, failing to recognize their incongruability. Rambling, its account of external reality lacks truth, amounting to a solipsistic projection of its inner activity which passes for an objective account existing independently of the activity of self-consciousness.

Rather than cease its vulgar rambling, it carries on, clothing it with the regal and priestly garments of scientific sounding jargon: the unity of transcendental apperception. Transcendental apperception brings together the disparate and mutually exclusive doctrines of idealism and empiricism, transitioning from one the other via a sequence of six schematic steps that can be expressed as logical propositions:

1. All experience is the temporal succession of a variety of contents organized spatially.
2. To be experienced at all, the successive data must be combined or held together in a unity of consciousness
3. Unity of experience implies unity of self.
4. The unity of self is an element of the unity of experience.
5. Therefore, experience both of self and its objects rests on acts of synthesis that, because they are conditions of any experience, are not themselves experienced.
6. These prior syntheses are made possible by the categories. The categories allow us to synthesize the self and its experience of external objects.

This list looks impressive. It is senseless rambling. Consider the first step; that all experience is the temporal succession of a variety of contents organized spatially. It appears that self-conscious Reason, i.e. Kant, has accounted for the unconditioned empirical object of external experience. This ruse relies for its plausibility on the forgetfulness of the reader. Kant himself states in the Transcendental Aesthetic that the primacy of self-consciousness must be assumed in apprehending space and time:

"In whatsoever mode, or by whatsoever means, our knowledge may relate to objects, it is at least quite clear, that the only manner in which it immediately relates to them, is by means of intuition, thought being only a means aiming at intuitions...

"Space is not an empirical concept which has been derived from outward appearances. For, in order that certain sensations may relate to something outside me (that is, to something that occupies a different part of space from that in which I am); in like manner, in order that I may represent them not merely as outside of and next to each other, but also in separate places, the representation of space must already exist as a [mental] foundation. Consequently, the representation of space cannot be borrowed from the relations of external phenomena through experience...

"Space then is a necessary representation a priori, which serves for the foundation of all intuitions."

The only access that self-consciousness has to external objects is through intuition. Objects furnish themselves to intuitions by means of sensation alone. Space, as pure intuition, is the foundation of all intuitions, yet cannot possibly access and grasp any object external to self-consciousness. Self-conscious Reason, i.e Kant, continues:

"Space does not represent and property of objects as things in themselves, nor does it represent them in their relations to each other; in other words, space does not represent any determinations of objects such as attaches to the objects themselves..."

"Space is nothing else than the form of all appearaces of the external sense, that is, the subjective condition of sensibility, under which alone external intuition is possible."

Kant's space fails to be intuition, for it fails to grasp any empirical object abiding in the external flux of appearances. Self-conscious Reason, i.e. Kant, does not even allow the possibility for mind-independent objects to be known:

"Objects are quite unknown to us in themselves, and what we call outward objects are nothing else but mere representations of our sensibility, whose form is space, but whose real correlate, the thing-in-itself, is not known by means of these representation, nor can ever be."

Self-consciousness has the godlike power of creating everything it experiences for itself. Nothing external is ever grasped by the pure intuition of space; the only way to know empirical objects is by way of intuition, which consciousness senses. Empirical objects are external to self-consciousness. Since the foundation of all intuitions can never grasp anything empirical, it follows that nothing external to self-consciousness can ever be known by self-consciousness. Th same would be true for time, another, pure intuition:

"The concept of change, and with it the concept of motion, as change of place, is possible only through and in the representation of time."

"Time is nothing else than the form of the internal sense, that is, of the intuitions of ourselves and of our internal state. For time cannot be any determination of outward appearances. It has to do with neither shape nor position; it determines the relation of representations in our internal state."

The force that causes and solicits the motion of objects in the thought produced external world of appearances is the godlike power of the inner activity of self-conscious thought. Any contradiction that exists is resolved by the motion of time, i.e. time heals. Thus, Reason states that "it is only in time that it is possible to meet with two contradictorily opposed determinations in one thing, that is, after each other." Mutually contradictory thoughts can be "synthesized" by the pure intuition of time. In the Analytic of Concepts:

"The supreme principle of the possibility of all intuition in relation to sensibility [is] ... that all the manifold of intuition be subject to the formal conditions of space and time [and] ... that all the manifold in intuition be subject to conditions of the originally synthetic unity of apperception."

Self-conscious Reason identifies the unity of apperception the unity of self-consciousness, which is alone in its tranquil self-unity is the common denominator and unifier of the disparate elements of experience. Let us now consider point three; that the unity of experience implies the unity of self. As we have seen, the unity of experience also assumes and relies on the unity of self, since experience can only unfold in space and time, pure intuitions. But the immediate experience of self assumes and relies upon the self-same independent unity and reality of experience, the truth of which Reason has denied the demonstrability of actually existing. In other words, self-conscious Reason can never absolutely know with certainty that a reality exists outside of self-consciousness. By Reason's own reasoning, it pulls the rug from under itself, denying the necessary existence of the self-same independent unity and reality of experience which the immediate experience of self-consciousness qua self-consciousness requires. Without experience, there is no self-consciousness. Without self-consciousness, there is no experience. The relation between self-consciousness and the objective experience of external reality is, therefore, absolutely necessary. One cannot be had without the other.

"If knowledge is to have objective reality, that is, to relate to an object, and possess sense and meaning in respect to it, it is necessary that the object be given in some way or another. Without this, our concepts are empty, and we may indeed have thought by means of them, but by such thinking we have not, in fact, known anything, we have merely played with representation."

Self-conscious Reason, being certain of itself as the universal substrate of reality, where the unity of self-consciousness "is alone objectively valid", has precluded itself from ever knowing with certainty that objective reality independent of self-consciousness is real. Thus, it can only say that the reality of the flux of appearances is only a possibility. Taking the unity of self-conscious Reason for granted, it reasons that "we can only infer the existence of external things ... [which] is always unreliable" calling such an affair, which it itself engages in, an empty play of words, a game.

Astonishingly, Reason does not deny the truth of external mind-independent reality, but rather turns around and takes it for granted. It is now necessary to infer the unity of self-consciousness from experience; an inference which it took to be unreliable. It has reversed that which is demonstrated and that which demonstrates without knowing it. Like becomes unlike and unlike becomes like. When at one moment it clings to the truth of idealism, at another, it discards in favor of empiricism. Invoking the inverted law, it does so without knowing that it does. Engaging in mere word play, while denying that it does this, Reason fails to express objective knowledge, when really it only expresses its own activity, taking its subjective inner self, confusing it with the universal category of self, not being the self but a thought product of the self, to be the only objective truth.

Oscillating in a single breath between empiricism and idealism, self-conscious Reason writes that "the mere concept of a thing does not contain any mark of its existence...[Since] the concept of [experience] precedes the perception [of experience] merely indicates the possibility of its existence, it is perception which [provides] the material to the concept, that is the sole mark of reality." Experience and perception precede each other simultaneously. In other words, two is less than two. Amidst this ridiculous wordplay masquerading as objective truth, which has the reputation of being serious philosophy at the time of this writing, Reason produces the necessary condition that would make inferences regarding external reality rationally valid.

Self-conscious Reason, as the self-conscious transcendental unity of apperception, operates according to schematizing rules that precede, yet discursively account for with absolute precision, the activity of self-consciousness. These rules can be extended beyond the activity of self-consciousness to the empirical objects of external appearances. By means of this rules, and taking the truth of its self-unity for granted, Reason would be able to establish not merely the possibility of the reality of external appearances, but the truth of the given reality of external appearances. Reason, in search of these schematizing rules that universally apply to the totality of external appearances, seeks knowledge of the external reality as it is in itself, unconditioned by the activity of self-consciousness. These universally applicable schematizing necessary rules would a fortiori apply to the activity of self-conscious Reason. Since these universally applicable schematizing necessary rules emanate from Reason, they are rational. In attempting to establish the rationality, i.e. true self-certain knowledge, of the external appearances, Reason observes.

The Unhappy Consciousness: On the Metaphysical Foundations of Religion

Unhappy Consciousness

Introduction

The experience of two distinct self-consciousnesses, which began as a relationship, and a life and death struggle, in the external actuality of an objective world, has produced two distinct self-consciousnesses relating in internal actuality of a single self-consciousness. What began as an external struggle has become an internal struggle. Self-consciousness has assumed the shape of the unhappy consciousness. It is the gazing of one self-consciousness into another, two mutually exclusive components that are inseparable, yet divided. A similar transformation occurred when a singular force became two forces. A force is not a property of any one object, but rather results from the interaction between at least two objects. From this interaction, two equal and opposite forces emerge, one that is stable and self-same, another that is in flux and related to another. Just like force, the unhappy consciousness is a result from the interaction of two equal and opposite self-consciousnesses. The result of this interaction is the awareness of the unhappy consciousness of its inner division.

It is aware of its inner disruption; this awareness is the root of its unhappiness, yet it does not know why it is internally disrupted. It began as the rigid stoic, immersed and finding satisfaction in the self-same and tranquil universality of thought. Even though the stoic had tranquility in its rigid thought and personality, it lacked freedom. The self-bewildering skeptic emerged as an attempt to secure the freedom the stoic lacked, but in doing so the skeptic lost its inner tranquility, and became a lazy, wretched, contingent self which lacked a mind of its own. A natural ruler became a natural slave.

The pure, universal thinking of the stoic has receded into the supersensible beyond, the heavenly realm of stable and inert lawlike generalizations. For the unhappy consciousness, this transcendent consciousness is the unchangeable - the essential, self-identical, self-mastering, self-knowing, unchanging, universal, immortal and sacred being. The other immanent consciousness, which emerged from the skeptic, is changeable - the unessential, self-differentiated, self-enslaved, self-bewildering, changing, particular, mortal and profane being.

The unhappy consciousness is both, yet the self-bewilderment produced by its changeable component absolutely prevents the unhappy consciousness from reconciling itself with itself and attain happiness. The opposition between profane changeable and sacred unchangeable is a mutual exclusivity. The changeable consciousness, immersed in the fluctuating world of appearances, sees the unchangeable as an alien being that resides somewhere out there in the supersensible, heavenly, stable, and tranquil beyond. Just as the stoic did to himself, the unchangeable legislates, institutes commandments, restrains and passes judgment on the changeable. The unchangeable is the changeable; in its bewilderment and lack of faith in itself, the changeable does not realize that the commands and restraints that the unchangeable bestows upon it were all along solicited by the changeable. The changeable consciousness sees the unchangeable with awe. All its attempts to reconcile with the unchangeable, due to the self-bewilderment of the changeable, are futile.

Be that as it may, the unchangeable is the self-same, true, being-for-self of the unhappy consciousness. As we know from the being-for-self of a thing with diverse properties, being-for-self contains being-for-another. In other words, in order for the unchangeable to truly relate to itself, it must relate to another. Relating to self without distinguishing oneself from another is an abstract, indeterminate falsehood. The self-sameness of the universal unchangeable self-consciousness necessitates self-differentiation, by the inverted law, since it is the True. Thus, the unchangeable sets aside its general universality, and incarnates itself into a particular individual that engages in pure thought.

The unchangeable comes down from the supersensible beyond, and immerses itself in the changeable world of appearances in a living, changeable, particular, individual, living body. The unchangeable, although it is an individual immersed in the flux of appearances, remains self-same in the pure universality of thought. Since the changeable and unchangeable are in truth equal and opposite, despite the self-bewilderment of the changeable consciousness, the changeable witnesses the incarnation of the unchangeable.

The changeable, being self-bewildering and thus estranged from the True, sees that the incarnation happens, but does not know why the incarnation happens. The changeable consciousness views the incarnation as an uncaused, unknowable, mystical, yet somehow fortunate event. Logos becomes flesh for no other reason than the divine grace and love of the Father. The changeable does not see that the incarnate is necessitated by the very nature of self-consciousness, that like becomes unlike, and unlike becomes like. Force proper is solicited to express itself by force expressed.

The character of the relationship between the two, mutually exclusive poles of the unhappy consciousness, changes. No longer are the changeable and unchangeable mutually exclusive, but due to the unchangeable having been solicited to express itself, and incarnate, as an individual immersed in the flux of appearances by a changeable consciousness that is also an individual immersed in the flux of appearances, there is overlap between the two poles of the unhappy consciousness. The incarnated sacred being, still immersed in pure universal thought, restrained and self-mastered, teaches the changeable profane being about the nature of the True. The changeable is bewildered, and awed, by the presence of the unchangeable.

Unfortunately for the changeable consciousness, unlike becomes like, and the mortal body which the unchangeable inhabits must vanish. The fluid universality of life necessitates that living bodies decay. The unchangeable knows this, and chooses to return to its self-same tranquility in the supersensible beyond. Demonstrating its self-mastery, it shows that it does not fear death, for it knows itself to be unchanging, and immortal.

Being completely self-mastered, unchangeable self-conscious shows that the death of its mortal body is only the shedding of an empty husk. Communing with itself in the supersensible beyond, the unchangeable again differentiates itself from itself and incarnates anew in the deceased body. With this final demonstration, the unchangeable vanishes, exhorting the changeable consciousness to cease its self-bewilderment.

In witnessing the individuation of the unchangeable, the changeable relates its own individuality to the individuality of the unchangeable, seeking to regain identification with it, and hence salvation from the damnation of being a wretched contingent self-consciousness.

These three modes in which the changeable relates to the unchangeable have been given names in Western history. Since, the changeable considers the unchangeable to be the essential component of the unhappy consciousness, the changeable assigns the names for these modes of relation to the unchangeable. To the mutual exclusivity of changeable and unchangeable, it is referred to as the Father; to the overlapping, the Son; to the attempt at identification, going either way, the Holy Spirit.

The attempt at identification of the changeable to the unchangeable, and the reconciliation of both poles of the unhappy consciousness, is threefold. Since, the unchangeable incarnated in a living body immersed in the fluctuating world of appearances, and nevertheless remain immersed in pure universal thought, the changeable attempts to reconnect with the unchangeable by immersing itself in pure thought. This mode of identification is pure consciousness.

Pure Consciousness

The changeable consciousness is defined by its self-bewilderment. Hence it cannot relate to the unchangeable by engaging in genuine pure thought. In essence, the changeable is attempting to identify with unchangeable, having been made possible by the incarnation of the pure unchangeable activity of thinking. The changeable, which is immersed in the animal life of fluctuating appearances, is immersed in the pure changeable activity of feeling. Further, the changeable consciousness is an advancement, and hence an analog, of the bondsman - the unchangeable it calls Lord. The pure feeling of the changeable is purity; this is a metaphysical, logical, factual, and physical necessity. Thus, the changeable consciousness, an analog of the bondsman, in its pure feeling offers himself for the service of the unchangeable, the analog of the lord.

The changeable freely offers himself as a vehicle to execute the will of the unchangeable. The changeable, in engaging in this kind of activity, eo ipso produces a genuinely free act and engages in a genuinely free deed. The unhappy consciousness is a divided will, as was the main cause of St. Augustine's lamentations in his Confessions. Life is a vale of tears. The changeable consciousness, in its self-bewilderment, does not recognize the unity that exists between it and the unchangeable consciousness. In the same that the changeable unknowingly solicited the unchangeable to express itself, and incarnate into flesh, the changeable solicited the will of the unchangeable. The will of the unchangeable, whose execution the changeable has offered itself, is in truth the will of the changeable.

In offering itself to execute the will of the unchangeable, the changeable executes its own will. In its self-bewilderment, the changeable does not credit itself as the ultimate cause of its free, and pure, activity. So goes the prayer:

"Not my patience, but God's patience.

Not my strengh, but God's strength.

Not my live, but God's love.

Not my forgiveness, but God's forgiveness."

It is through feeling that the changeable devotes itself to the unchangeable, seeking to identify itself with the pure thinking of the unchangeable through the purity of its feeling. The solicitation, which the changeable unknowingly initiates, requires the presence of a determinate artifact in which inheres the presence of the unchangeable, to solicit the solicitation. The devotion of the changeable requires the presence of an artifact. At first, this artifact is the living flesh of the incarnated unchangeable immersed in the fluctuating external world of appearances. As is necessitated by the inverted law that governs the world of appearances, like becomes unlike, and the presence of the incarnated body of the unchangeable pure activity of thought must vanish, and become a remote memory in spacetime.

The empty grave, too, which it leaves behind, must also vanish. The artifacts that solicit the devotion of the changeable, on their own, vanish and decay. Thus, the changeable, through its devotion, strives to preserve the artifacts that vanish in order to preserve its devotion. It preserves icons, the most famous of which was the Holy Grail in the Roman Catholic tradition.

In the presence of these icons, in which inhere the presence of the unchangeable, the changeable, through its activity, identifies itself to the inert and stable icons, which contain self-differentiation, in a self-differentiating activity that contains self-same and inert stability. The changeable engages in the recurring pattern of ritualized behaviour, producing the sign of the cross through the movement of its limbs, for example.

Through this ritualized behaviour, the changeable feels a link to the purity of the unchangeable activity of thinking through the purity of feeling. The changeable imagines itself to have achieved an identity with the unchangeable through feeling, supposing that the unchangeable is an alien and external being immersed in a heavenly supersensible beyond. But the unhappy conscious does not allow itself to see that this projection of the unchangeable into the beyond is its own activity. The pure feeling of the beyond is the self-feeling of inner disruption.

The individual changeable consciousness feels itself as an actual feeling individual. It feels its own emotions and sensations, as well as its desire. Its desire requires satisfaction, and its satisfaction requires work and labour. This doubled, and sanctified, pure feeling of self has a genuinely universal character that belongs to the changeable exists on its own account. Discovering the constancy of self feeling through ritualized activity, the changeable learns the dynamics of desire and satisfaction as mentioned in the article on life. This discovery, along with the inner disruption of the unhappy consciousness qua changable, induces the pure changeable consciousness to attribute sanctity to work, which turns its mind away from desire in having satisfied it.

Desire and Work

The satisfaction that the changeable consciousness receives from work is the achievement of self-communion, and hence tranquility and unity with the universal. Since only the unchangeable is universal and essential, the changeable consciousness attritubes its own satisfaction as being truly the satisfaction of the universal unchangeable consciousness.

No longer does the changeable require the physical presence of an icon imbued with the presence of the universal in order to achieve unity with the universal. The reconciliation of the estranged poles of the unhappy consciousness is now confined within the activity of a single individual. The inward disruption of the unhappy consciousness prevents the changeable from achieving the self-certainty that would result from said reconciliation. Just as desire and work give the changeable a feeling of satisfaction, its connection to the universal unchangeable, so too does desire and work emphasize the inner disruption of the unhappy consciousness.

Desire and work is the mode in which the unhappy consciousness relates to its own living body immersed in the fluctuating world of appearances. Both self-unity through satisfaction, and self-division through dissatisfaction emerges from the relation between the unhappy consciousness and its relation to the external flux of appearances. There are recurring patterns of the external world of appearances, such as the ritualized behaviour of the changeable which reaches out and touches the unchangeable, of which work has become (a routine); there also appears to be aspects of the external world that do not, for the unhappy consciousness, have the appearance of any rhythm that is related to the beyond of the unchangeable; it is wild and untamed nullity that exists for self-consciousness merely to be set aside and consumed. To the former, the unhappy consciousness credits as the beautiful expression the the sacred; to the latter, the unhappy consciousness credits as the profane expression of the profane.

The inward division of the unhappy consciousness, like a pair of glasses with broken lenses, cleaves the external fluctuating world of appearances in two. The inner disruption of the unhappy consciousness is reflected outward. When it works upon the objective fluctuating world of appearances, the changeable asserts its independence, and hence its rigid universal firmness, on that external world. It restrains its desire, shapes the world in accordance to the thought products of its will, and cancels the independence of the external world. This world is divided, and has two unreconciled poles, sacred and profane. The sacred external world is connected to the sacred, self-relating, unchangeable consciousness. Indeed, the sacred external world, like force expressed, is the external expression of the unchangeable consciousness; they are both absolutely self-relating. The external and internal sacred are differences that are none.

That the world is divided into sacred and profane is the working of the unhappy consciousness' divided intellect, perception, and sense. Independently of self-consciousness, there is no division in the external world of appearances for itself. The division of the external is a projection of the unhappy consciousness. Hence, self-consciousness cannot identify exactly what draws the line between sacred and profane. What is profane in one moment may be sacred at another, and vice versa - like becomes unlike, and unlike becomes like. Thus, the changeable consciousness, contrary to its pedestalized view of the unchangeable, works on the sacred external world, cancels its independence, and consumes it for its own enjoyment.

The changeable consciousness accounts for this discrepancy by asserting that the unchangeable freely reliquishes its externalized expression so that the changeable may work on what it desires, and attain enjoyment from its satisfaction. The fruits of the sacred world are gifts to the changeable consciousness, originating from an alien source. The unchangeable freely renounces and surrenders the independence of its embodied form to the changeable. Thus, the changeable gives thanks.

In doing this, the changeable denies itself of satisfaction, for satisfaction is the affirmation of its own inner, tranquil, harmonious, independent, unity; only the enjoyment remains. The unhappy consciousness denies itself the satisfaction of being made certain of its freedom and independence. The ultimate cause of its desire, and the motion of its limbs in the ritualized pattern of work, is the unchangeable. The changeable, in attributing its own independence to the unchangeable, engages in self-surrender.

The unhappy consciousness learns that the changeable and unchangeable reciprocally surrender themselves for each other. However, this unity is a bare overlap, not a total identification. The changeable achieves unity with the unchangeable only in the moments of time that it engages in ritualized behaviour, whether through work or ceremony. Once it ceases this ritualized behaviour, so too does the unity between changeable and unchangeable.

Furthermore, in giving thanks, the surrender of the changeable's self-satisfaction is only a ritualized, finite, self-surrender. This kind of self-surrender is only the show, a shadow, of a genuine, infinite, self-surrender. In making the show of self-satisfaction, it in truth obtains self-satisfaction and enjoyment. Thus, in renouncing its self-independence, the changeable in truth affirms its own self-independence. Only its words, the stories that the changeable tells, does it attribute the ultimate cause of its satisfaction to the unchangeable dwelling in the heavenly supersensible beyond. In deed, the changeable shows itself to be its own ultimate cause of self-satisfaction. It cannot refrain itself from the self-feeling of satisfaction, for that said feeling gushes forth from the fountain of self. There is no surrender on the part of the changeable, and in turn the unchangeable does not surrender its embodied form to the changeable. No reciprocity of surrender exists.

From this experience, the changeable, in learning of the impossibility of surrendering its independent on its own, has asserted itself and is certain of itself as an independent individuality. Even its giving thanks is an independent act. By its will and deed, the changeable consciousness learns and experiences the existential state of genuine independence and free will.

In being aware of its independent individuality, the changeable immerses itself in contingency and particularity. It becomes aware of itself as this actual individual that possesses a living, animal body, immersed in the fluctuating world of appearances. The living body of the animal is self-identical and self-differentiating, and thus engages in the processes of animal functions.

The changeable becomes wretched in its own eyes, for the universality that connects it to the sacred universal is the self-same and self-repeating excresion of feces, and its lusting after flesh for its sexual gratification. It sees itself as defiled; these animal functions are too a work for it that, once having been accomplished, relieve the changeable of pain and give it satisfaction. The changeable does not attribute the significance of universality to its universality. As Hegel notes, "we have here only a personality confined to its own self and its own petty actions, a personality brooding over itself, as wretched as it is impoverished."

In brooding over a particularity divested of the significance of universality, the changeable cannot genuinely, completely, infinitely divest this most extreme of particularities - these regular and the ritualized concupiscence of one night stands, moments of excretion, vomitting, eating, etc. - the changeable cannot deny that these defiled functions recur, and hence, are absolutely involved in the process of self-identification and self-differentiation. Thus, the self-identity of the universal unchangeable is present even in the most extreme and vulgar of particularities. This kind of universal, its animal instincts of desire immersed in the fluctuating world of appearances, it calls the seven deadly sins.

Ashamed and defiled, engaging in the shameful, defiled, sinful activity of its animal functions, the unhappy consciousness recognizes too that its own thoughts are shameful and defiled; it is disgusted with itself. Such an extreme particular can in no way be related to the universal self-sameness of the unchangeable. Yet, the words "shameful", "defiled", "sinful", only make sense in relation of a universal. An animal does not consider its animal functions to be either shameful or defiled or sinful; it cannot be disgusted with itself, by virtue of its only concern being the self-preservation of itself and its own kind - the genus. Disgust is a visceral avoidance of that which lacks the sacred beauty of self-same universality; in order for a consciousness to be disgusted with itself, it presupposes that the consciousness has an intellectual apprehension of that sacred, unchangeable, good, beauty of self-same universality, in contrast to the fallen, self-bewildering changeable. Further, both the sacred unchangeable and profane changeable must be a real, existing, independent, and self-same actuality in order for disgust to exist.

The unhappy consciousness learns that the changeable and unchangeable are related by means of the mediation of the changeable's intellectual apprehension of the sacred unchangeable - genuine thought.

The Mediator

Genuine thought is distinct from what consciousness has thus far regarded as thought. To make clear the nature of this distinction, we now turn to the unhappy consciousness which we have been referring to, appearing in European history by the name Benedict of Nursia, author of the Benedictine Code. Regarding these two kinds of thought, cogitation, Benedict remarks as such:

"We are in two manner of ways, ... , carried out of ourselves: for either we fall under ourselves by sinful cogitation, or else we are, by the grace of contemplation, lifted above ourselves. He that kept hogs, through wanderings of his mind and unclean thoughts, fell under himself, He whom the Angel delivered out of prison, being also rapt by the Angel into an ecstasy, was in truth out of himself, but yet above himself. Both of them, therefore, returned to themselves; the one when he recollected himself, and forsook his lewd kind of life; and the other from the top of contemplation, to have that usual judgment and understanding, which before he had."

Sinful cogitation corresponds to the thought of the changeable, which it inherited from the skeptic. The grace of contemplation, genuine thought, corresponds to the thought of the changeable, which it inherited from the stoic, which allows it to become self-same and free amidst the flux of appearances. According to Benedict, one turns away from sin through prayer, the genuine contemplation of thought, and work. One may read more on him here. We shall end our brief mention of Benedict with the following. Let the reader interpret the meaning it:

"Benedict having now given over the school, with a resolute mind to lead his life in the wilderness: his nurse alone, who tenderly loved him, would not by any means give him over. Coming, therefore, to a place called Enside and remaining there in the church of St. Peter, in the company of other virtuous men, which for charity lived in that place, it fell so out that his nurse borrowed of the neighbors a sieve to make clean wheat, which being left negligently on the table, by chance it was broken in two pieces. Whereupon she fell pitifully weeping, because she had borrowed it. The devout and religious youth Benedict, seeing his nurse so lamenting, moved with compassion, took away with him both the pieces of the sieve, and with tears fell to his prayers; and after he had done, rising up he found it so whole, that the place could not be seen where before it was broken."

The relation between changeable and unchangeable is not yet reconciled, but mediated by genuine thought. Thought is the activity of a self-consciousness immersed in the fluctuating world of appearances with a living body. It is the activity of the bondsman, who lives in poverty, engaging in a rigid activity of thought producing, all the while restraining his own desires, piously turning away from sin. Thus, it is the clergy who takes upon itself the responsibility of mediating between the changeable and unchangeable. We have a syllogism, where the changeable and unchangeable are reciprocally the major and minor premises, while the priest, guru, imam, etc., is the middle term. Henceforth, "changeable" consciousness will refer to those self-consciousnesses who did not have the inner devotion and work ethic to become mediators.

The changeable consciousness again attempts to engage in genuine pure thought in order to reconnect to the unchangeable. Before, the changeable attempted to reconnect via direct imitation of the incarnated unchangeable. This resulted in the changeable's devotion to the unchangeable. The changeable offered his willing and thinking to the service of the unchangeable. In immersing itself in pure thinking, the changeable hoped to enact the will of the unchangeable. It turned out that the changeable executed its own will, rather than the will of the changeable. In an analogous sense, rather than connect to the unchangeable through feeling, the changeable only came to feel its own inner disruption.

The changeable consciousness surrenders its will to the mediator, who like the changeable consciousness is immersed in the flux of appearances, and need not be a distant memory. Thus, the changeable divests itself of free will, and with it the responsibility of making decisions for its own thoughts and actions. The ultimate source and impetus of the willing of the changeable is the unchangeable, mediated by the advice that the mediator renders upon the changeable on how to think and act rightly. The mediator does this legitimately, for it engages in the genuine pure activity of thinking.

The changeable has genuinely surrendered its willing, its activity of thinking, to the unchangeable via the mediation of the mediator. The self-feeling of its own particular, contingent, inner disruption, its animal desires, however, remains. The satisfaction which led the changeable to turn its feelings from the pangs of desire through work turned out to be not the satisfaction of the unchangeable, but the satisfaction of the changeable, which it cannot resist due its being a self-consciousness that desires self-certainty. The changeable surrenders part, or less than the entirety, of the fruit of its work and labor, and its enjoyment and satisfaction, to the mediator. The mediator accepts these fruits as tithes.

In surrendering itself of its will and thinking, the changeable divests itself of its inner independence. It is no longer being-for-self but being-for-another. It does, thinks, and speaks what is foreign to it. In the Roman Catholic tradition, that foreign language is Latin. In surrendering the fruit of its work and labour, and the enjoyment and satisfaction derived therefrom, it surrenders the means to affirm and maintain through nutrition the objective actuality of its particular will and living body. The changeable divests itself of its outer independence. It fasts and engages in self-mortification to show its piety.

The changeable consciousness completely deprives itself of the consciousness of inner and outer freedom, the very freedom for which it risked its own life and animal independence in the struggle for life and death. It surrenders its own life, while remaining alive, through surrendering the actual experience of its being-for-self, the tranquility of its self-sameness. The changeable has in essence divested itself of the universal element that inheres within, its connection to infinity, the self. The changeable is no longer a self-consciousness, but a thing with many properties. It is not even the intellect of the understanding, for the changeable has surrendered its willing and thinking to the mediator. The changeable has become the profane and contingent particularity it had credited itself of being.

As we have seen in the section on perception, the thing and its many properties are both universals and particulars. The particular thing, the changeable consciousness, wills its own will to be the will of the universal unchangeable. As we have seen in the section of the understanding, the activity of willing and thinking is eo ipso entangled with the universality and unchangeable self-identity and self-differentiation of infinity, the universal substance/subject. The changeable consciousness, in having divested itself of its inner and outer freedom, leading the life of a thing, is utterly unable to divest itself of the universal character of its thinking, and willing - its self.

The changeable wills itself to surrender part, or less than the entirety, of the fruit of its work and labour, and the enjoyment and satisfaction derived therefrom. This action is done in accordance to a will that cannot divest itself of universality. Thus, the changeable is utterly unable to divest its actions, its ritualized behaviour, its doings of universality. As a particular, contingent self-consciousness, deprived of its inner and outer freedom, the changeable is unable to divest itself of its own universal character.

In principle, the willing and doing, the thoughts and actions, of the changeable are self-same and universal - Absolute. Thus, the changeable reconciles itself with the unchangeable, and what began as the inner division of the stoic self-consciousness into two self-consciousnesses, has again become whole. The thoughts and actions of self-consciousness are, in principle, Absolute. Having relieved itself of the anguish of its inner disruption, the principle of the absolute and universal character of its thought and action becomes instinctive for self-consciousness. This reconciliation of unchangeable and changeable has relieved self-consciousness of its unhappiness - replacing the unhappiness with a certainty that it, as a particular consciousness, is a universal consciousness as well. Being certain that it is all reality, self-consciousness has assumed the shape of Reason.